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Less than Meets the Eye:
Antidiscrimination and the Development of
Section 5 Enforcement and Eleventh
Amendment Abrogation Law Since
City ofBoerne v. Flores
by JUSTIN SCHWARTZ*
Introduction
In a series of cases over the last decade, the Supreme Court has
developed a novel interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. The
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL; J.D.,
Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University; Ph.D, M.A., The University of
Michigan; M.Phil., The University of Cambridge; A.B., Princeton University. Thanks are
due for helpful comments to Professors Stuart Ford, Cecil Hunt II, Ravi Malhotra, Robert
Nye, Steven Schwinn, and Mark Wilson, and to participants in the Faculty Work in
Progress Series, John Marshall, Spring 2009, and in the panel on disability law at the
Canadian Society for Law and Society, May 2009, where distant ancestors of this paper
were presented, and to my research assistant Christopher Heery. Part of the research for
this paper was funded by a John Marshall Faculty Summer Research Grant, Summer 2009.
1. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as an invalid use of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment protects states from private
patent lawsuits); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that states have sovereign
immunity against private suits under Fair Labor Standard Act in state as well as federal
court); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") does not abrogate state's sovereign
immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding, inter alia, that civil
remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA") failed as
valid Section 5 action); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding
that Title I (employment discrimination) of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
failed to abrogate Eleventh Amendment); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721 (2003) (holding that Congress successfully abrogated state sovereign immunity in
enacting the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004) (holding the same with respect to Title II (public accommodation) of the ADA in
the context of access to the courts); United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (holding
[259]
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conventional wisdom is that, for good or ill, the new interpretation
has made it far more difficult for private citizens to sue a state under a
statute enacted by Congress.2 The innovative doctrine may be called
"the Boerne Doctrine," after City of Boerne v. Flores,3 the first in the

line of cases that made this interpretation the law. As understood for
the last hundred and twenty years, the Eleventh Amendment
conferred on the states sovereign immunity from suit by individuals
unless the state consented to be sued or Congress clearly abrogated
Because the new
the state's immunity in enacting a statute.

that Title II of the ADA abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity insofar as it also
involved a constitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment).
2. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zeitlow, 'Free at Last': Anti-subordinationand the Thirteenth
Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 310 n.454 (2010) (stating that City of Boerne restricted
Congress's authority to enact civil rights legislation); John F. Manning, Federalismand the
Generality Problem in ConstitutionalInterpretation,122 HARv. L. REV. 2003,2069 (2009);
William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional Roles: The Fate of the Equal
Protection Class of One and What It Means for Congressional Power to Enforce
Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 73 (2009) (stating that instead of "validating
approaches that promise to vindicate meritorious claims at the cost of allowing some nonmeritorious ones to go forward, the Court flips the default in the other direction,
prohibiting all claims of a certain type, even when some of them might be meritorious");
Mary Ziegler, Ways to Change: A Reevaluation of Article V Campaigns and Legislative
Constitutionalism,2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 969, 971 (2009) (City of Boerne placed "stringent
limits on Congress's fourteenth-amendment authority to define constitutional rights or
remedies differently than the Court." (emphasis added)); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Protectingthe Constitutionfrom the People: JuricentricRestrictions on Section Five Power,
78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (stating that in the Boerne Doctrine cases to date, "the Court has

imposed ever more restrictive conditions on Congress's ability to exercise its Section 5
power"); Alice Ristroph, Proportionalityas a Principleof Limited Government, 55 DUKE
L.J. 263, 297 (2005) ("The congruence and proportionality standard ... [is] a means of
restricting government power in accordance with specific injuries or problems that give
rise to the power."); THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN
HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 239 (2004) (Section Five

cases are particularly notable since they "significantly narrow[ed] Congress's authority in
the civil rights field."); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 445 (2000)

("However interpreted, the Court's decisions in Kimel and Morrison [applying the Boerne
framework] impose[d] new and substantial restrictions on Congress's power to enact
antidiscrimination laws under Section 5."); David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution,
and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 973 (2001) (arguing that the Boerne Court's

"congruence and proportionality" test "reflects . . . new distrust of congressional
judgments" about "what is needed to protect constitutional rights"). Examples could be
further multiplied.
3. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
4. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The "State" includes "agencies acting
under [State] control." P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 144 (1993); Welch v. Tex. Highways & Pub. Transp. Dep't, 483 U.S. 468, 480 (1987).
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interpretation made Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment' the
only power under which Congress could create a private claim for
relief against nonconsenting states, this new construction had
particular impact on antidiscrimination law. However, it also had
general implications for any right applied against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment or enforcement legislation passed
pursuant to, or requiring the authority of, Section 5.
The Court's novel reading is less than wholly transparent. It has
been widely thought to "handcuff Congress' ability to respond to
pressing public concerns"' as well as to lack constitutional grounding.
Commentators have said that the new doctrine sends "ominous
signals about the future of federal antidiscrimination law."9 "The
stakes are . . . potentially very high. [In principle, v]irtually the entire

class of modern civil rights litigation might be barred by an expansive
Other writers, more
reading of the immunity of the states. ...,
favorable to modern day, state-centered New Federalism, agree about
the effects but find them encouraging." I share the critics' concerns

5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The reasoning of the Boerne
Doctrine has also been applied to the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
legislation thereunder, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which the Court consistently
holds up as setting a standard for successful Section 5 legislation. See infra notes 52, 84
and accompanying text.
6. City of Boerne itself concerned the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Florida Prepaid, concerned Due Process rights to intangible property. Alden concerned
the Fair Labor Standards Act; Lane, Due Process rights of access to judicial services; and
United States v. Georgia, Eighth Amendment rights to be free of cruel or unusual
punishment. The discrimination claims in this line included Kimel (age), Garrett
(disability in employment), Morrison and Hibbs (sex discrimination), Lane (disability in
public accommodations), and United States v. Georgia(same). See supra note 2.
7. Bryan Dearinger, Note, The State of the Nation, Not the State of the Record:
Finding Problems with Judicial 'Review' of Eleventh Amendment Abrogation Legislation,
53 DRAKE L. REV. 421, 475 (2005).
8. Id.; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 11 (2002) (In "'the Battle of Boerne' . . . the

Supreme Court invented criteria for Congress that invaded the legislative domain.").
9. Post & Siegel, Equal Protection by Law, supra note 2, at 441.
10.

Peter W. Low & John C. Jeffries, Jr., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 932 (5th ed. 2004) (noting that, read broadly enough, the
immunity could in principle be extended to sub-state governmental entities and local
officials-although it has not been so extended, and the Boerne Doctrine does not do this).
11. See, e.g., Michael Kennan, Is United States v. Morrison Antidemocratic?:Political
Safeguards, Deference, and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 48 How. L.J. 267, 293-94
(2004) (defending judicial review to enforce federalism and offering a useful summary of
the literature to that date, id. at 307); see also Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos,
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about the internal logic, legal grounds, and to some degree the
potential policy implications of the new doctrine, but in this Article I
make a different simple and direct point that has largely been
overlooked, despite its signal importance for legislators, judges,
litigants, and lawyers. The point is that doctrine as it now stands is
considerably less drastic in its content and consequences than either
its many critics or some advocates have thought. Under it, "the sky
has not fall[en]"12 for antidiscrimination law, nor has a New Federalist
bulwark been drawn up protecting the states from federal incursionat least not one that is deep or high.
Instead, the Boerne Doctrine changed shape as it has developed,
becoming more amenable to Congress's power to act under Section 5
and to suits against a state." City of Boerne included both expansive

language about congressional powers to enforce constitutional rights
and also precatory warnings about the limits of those powers. In
addition it set forth a "congruence and proportionality" test for
whether Congress had validly exercised its Section 5 powers, a
condition of abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Up through
Morrison, the test was applied stringently and set a high bar to invoke
Section 5 legislation-one not cleared until Hibbs, but cleared and
The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of FederalAntidiscriminationLaw, 2000
Sup. CT. REV. 109, 110 (2000) (approving of the early Boerne cases).
12. Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State Sovereign
Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551,
1553 (2003) (reviewing NOONAN, supra note 8); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1377, 1381 n.25 (3d ed. 2000) (underlining the
importance of the development of the Boerne Doctrine as developed in City of Boerne,
Alden, and Florida Prepaid, and considering whether a "'Chicken Little' cry that the sky
was falling" was justified).
13. A few scholars have made somewhat similar observations in the context of
particular cases but, as far as I can tell, without extensive development or systematic
analysis of the whole range of cases. This Article appears to be the first systematic
analytical overview of this relatively little noted but very important change in the law. See,
e.g., William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power After Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39,
86 (2004) ("Lane represents an important, yet an incremental, step toward a more
expansive Section 5 power."); Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of
FederalAppellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 112-13 (2006) ("It is hard to see
Hibbs and Lane as anything other than a withdrawal from the narrow interpretation of
Section 5 taken in the earlier cases, and therefore as an expansion of the federal courts'
jurisdiction to hear claims against state defendants alleged to have violated plaintiffs'
federal statutory rights."); see also Kristin Clarke, The CongressionalRecord Underlying
the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How Much DiscriminationCan the Constitution Tolerate?, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 390 (2008) ("prescriptively" arguing that City of Boerne
and other precedents call for more deference to Congress in Section 5 legislation). The
thesis of this Article is descriptive. The law as it stands, I contend, has already lowered the
bar, though for quite different reasons than Kristen Clarke urges.
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perhaps lowered there and in the two following cases, Lane and
United States v. Georgia. That is, the Court found successful Section 5
action in the last three Boerne Doctrine cases. 4 It is surprising to find
relaxation of a doctrine that initially limited federal power from a
Court that holds generally to an overall "New Federalist"
perspective." We can explain the shift at least in part internally
through the development of the Boerne Doctrine to include a wider
range of resources than indicated in City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid,

Kimel, Garrett,and Morrison, which made it easier to satisfy the new
conditions on Section 5 action and Eleventh Amendment abrogation.
Why this happened, apart from the internal unfolding of the logic of
legal doctrine itself, is a subject for another time. The tendency might
be halted, as City of Boerne, its predecessorsl6 and immediate progeny
halted a previous contrary trend. My object here, however, is not to
offer a critique of, or an alternative to, the Boerne Doctrine, nor to
speculate about its future. It is to expound the law as it has
developed and to show that it is different from the conventional
wisdom. As things stand, there are greater resources for effective
Section 5 action, abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and
private lawsuits against the states than has been widely believed.
In Part I.A, I briefly review the history of the Eleventh
Amendment up to the development of the Boerne Doctrine. Part I.B
14. This is a tendency. As Auric Goldfinger says in the James Bond movie
Goldfinger (1964): "Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time is enemy
action." That characterization "enemy action" represents a point of view solicitous of the
states and skeptical of federal power. Some (and I am one) who have different policy
preferences or a hold a legal framework with a more extensive view of federal power to
defend individual rights would characterize the developments otherwise, as friendly
action.
15. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 2, at 2004 ("[T]he Rehnquist Court's ... most
distinctive mark in constitutional law has been its revival of meaningful federalism
constraints on the exercise of federal power prescribed by Acts of Congress."); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 47 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 569, 570 (2003) (same); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 23 (2004) (same). Some of the important cases include: United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding a limit on Congress's Commerce powers for the first
time in sixty years); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act's take-title provision, requiring states
to accept ownership of waste or submit to congressional regulation, violates the Tenth
Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the Brady Act's
requirement that state officials conduct background checks on gun purchasers violates
federalism); and, of course, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S 507 (1997), and most of the
cases in its line.
16. Notably Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), and Seminole
Tribe of Floridav. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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sets forth the Court's official statement of the Boerne Doctrine itself,
focusing on the requirement that an abrogating enactment must be
"congruent and proportional,"" to the evil to be remedied. This
involves more or less intensive judicial review of the legislative record
and examination of the scope of the remedy. I elucidate the link that
the Court made between the intensity of review of the record and the
degree of scrutiny of state conduct (the "Inverse Relation Principle,"
as termed here): The lower the degree of scrutiny accorded to the
underlying substantive right, the more intense the review of the
legislative record and the remedy, and vice versa. In Part II.A-C.1, I
examine, via a careful analysis of the cases, the application and
development of the Doctrine in its restrictive mode. In Part II.C.2
and II.D, I show how the Court used the new resources it has created,
notably augmentation of the record with independent research and
reframing the issue to raise the level of review, to open a space for
more relaxed interpretation that makes it easier to find the evidence
support that triggers Congress's Section 5 remedial powers and
permits abrogation of state sovereign immunity. A summary and
brief discussion of the practical meaning of the development
chronicled in this Article follow in Part III, with an illustration of the
Boerne Doctrine's transformation by showing, hypothetically, how an
application of today's standards to Kimel might well have changed the
outcome.
I.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity Abrogation Through the
Rise of the Boerne Doctrine

A. Between Hans and City of Boerne Eleventh Amendment
Abrogation Doctrine from a Clear Statement Approach to a Powers
Analysis
1.

Hans and State Sovereign Immunity Against All Private Suits

Modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence began with Hans v.
Louisiana,"' which imposed a radically nontextual interpretation of
the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

17. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
18. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

Winter 2011]1

ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND SECTION 5

265

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.19
The Amendment was adopted in 1795 to overrule the 1793 case of
Chisholm v. Georgia.20 There the Supreme Court held that private
citizens might sue the states in federal court-or at least other states
than their own. The Amendment, by its plain terms, unambiguously
prohibited such suits and was adopted for that end. However, in
1890, the Court in Hans read the Amendment to bar citizen suits
against any state that does not consent to be sued, including one's
own. 2' The pre-Hans history of the Eleventh Amendment and the
"original" meaning of the constitutional text, are topics of a vast body
of scholarly literature and, until recently, much judicial debate that
need not concern us here.2 2 We begin with Hans's jurisdictional 23
prohibition on citizen (or alien) suits against any state.24 The bar
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
20. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).

21. Hans, 134 U.S. at 17. As expressly conceded by the Court itself, this was an
atextual reading. See id. at 10 ("[I]t is true that the amendment does so read," i.e., to bar
only citizen suits against other states.); Principality of Monaco v. Miss, 292 U.S. 313, 32331 (1934) (reading Hans to bar suits by aliens against nonconsenting states and defending
the atextual reading).
22. For discussion of the original meaning of the Amendment, see Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 300-01 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defending
"diversity interpretation," which argues that the Amendment only overruled citizen (and
alien) diversity jurisdiction). But cf Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977); William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 STAN.
L. REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); William P. Marshall, The
Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1372 (1989); John V. Orth, The Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment, 1793-1908: A
Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 423 (1983). See also Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 111 n.8 (1996); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 334 & n.27 (2005) (stating that the broader language
barring any suits against nonconsenting states "was floated by Chisholm's critics ... but
this language was never seriously considered").
23. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64 (noting that the Eleventh Amendment "limits the
federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III"). But see Kimel, 528 U.S. 62, 108 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting and concurring) (stating that under the "traditional view"
maintained by Justice James Iridell, the lone dissenter in Chisholm, "the sovereign
immunity defense as recognized as a matter of comity when asserted in the courts of
another sovereign rather than as a limitation on .. .jurisdiction").
24. Moreover, in many Eleventh Amendment cases, the question was framed in terms
of whether the states were subject to private suits for money damages in federal or state
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stated in Hans was not, however, absolute. This provides our theme:
What is required for Congress to enact legislation over Eleventh
Amendment immunity? The Boerne Doctrine, dating roughly to City
of Boerne v. Flores25 and Kirnel v. FloridaBoard of Regents,26 around

the turn of the present century, is the Court's latest word on the
subject. Understanding the new requirements involves seeing how
the Court replaced its prior focus on congressional intent with
emphasis on congressional power. Congressional intent remains
obligatory, but the Boerne Doctrine concerns the powers under which
Congress may act and what it must do to act under those powers.
Three main exceptions emerged to Hans's discovery of a general
state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment. First, under
Ex parte Young,2 7 a state officer acting in his official capacity who is in
alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment might be sued for
prospective injunctive relief, although not for retrospective monetary
damages. Second, a state may consent to suit, or (formerly) be
treated as having waived its immunity if the state adopted language or
engaged in conduct that allowed for no other interpretation.28 Third,

court. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66 (mentioning that petitioners sought money
damages); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (stating that the
question presented was the recoverability of money damages); Nev. Dep't of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) (same); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23 (2004)
(same). However, the Hans limitation on judicial power imposed by the Eleventh
Amendment encompasses immunity from suit "in law or equity," and not merely for
money damages, arising under either federal or state law. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. In re New
York 256 U.S. 490 (1921) extended the immunity to suits in admiralty. See also
Principalityof Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322.
25. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
26. Kimel, 528 U.S. 62. Kimel and City of Boerne were the core cases in the official
early statement of the doctrine; City of Boerne sets forth the key test for effective Section
5 action, and Kimel was the first case to fully apply it in a sovereign immunity context. See
infra Part 1I.B.1.i.
27. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Garrett reaffirms that private individuals
may seek injunctive relief against state officials via Ex parte Young actions. Garrett,531
U.S. at 374 n.9.
28. The Court permitted implied "clear statements" and "constructive" consent or
waiver to suffice for abrogation from Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks
Department, 377 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1964), up to Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985). Parden's constructive waiver theory was formally overruled in
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527
U.S. 666, 681 (1999). The modern clear statement rule is that the statement must be
express and clear from the statutory language alone. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,
228 (1989); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (same); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (same). In contrast, the Boerne Doctrine
made close examination of the legislative history the core of the abrogation inquiry, while
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Congress may override the sovereign immunity of a nonconsenting
state-that is, Congress may, in contemporary terms, "abrogate" that
immunity.'
What must Congress have done to "bring the states to heel in the
sense of lifting their immunity from suit . .. ?"30 This required: (1) a

clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate sovereign
immunity; and (2) appropriate congressional action to abrogate under
a valid power." Any lawful action by Congress or indeed by any
branch of the federal government must derive from a valid power
based in the Constitution. However, for most of the post-Hans
history of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court directed its attention
almost exclusively to the degree of clarity of the statement of
congressional intent.32
2.

The Rise of the Powers Analysis

The courts did not wholly ignore the source of congressional
power to trump Eleventh Amendment immunity was not wholly
ignored during the long era when they focused on clear statements
and consent, but it was rare that they gave the issue extended
analytical attention to power. In 1964, Parden v. Terminal Railway of

the current clear statement rules still disallow any attention to the legislative record. See
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55; Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 228.
29. "Abrogation" is a term that has changed meaning with the doctrine. The older
cases, prior to Atascadero, Green, or Dellmuth used it, in practice, to mean that Congress
expressed a clear intent to override state sovereign immunity. Even Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
the predecessor of City of Boerne, used the term "abrogate" only once, and in the
traditional sense of overriding state sovereign immunity through clear expression of
"congressional intent." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1976). The powers
issue was characterized in terms of "limitations" or "restrictions" on state power rather
than in terms of abrogation. See id at 454-56; see also infra notes 32, 38 and accompanying
text.
30. Emps. v. Mo. Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 283 (1973).
31. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73.
32. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 187-88 (stating that in making the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1908) "applicable to 'every' common carrier by railroad
in interstate commerce," Congress had shown that it meant the statute was to apply to all
such railroads, whether state-owned or not); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)
("When we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial interference in the vital
field of financial administration a clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its
fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found.") (internal
citations omitted); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (stating that "Congress may abrogate the
States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute," and therefore holding that
satisfaction of the new clear statement rule was the basis for abrogation).
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Alabama State Docks Department 33 stated, on the way to holding that
the state had impliedly waived its sovereign immunity by its conduct,
that the Commerce Clause Congress with the power to subject a
nonconsenting state to suit by private citizens.' This anticipated
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which directly so held.3 ' The powers
question was again addressed in detail in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer in 1976,
a Title VII case expressly upholding what we now call abrogation.36
The modern power-centered rule began to find expression in dicta in
the abrogation cases of the 1980s." These cases stated that some valid
exercise of a power-generally. Section 5, citing Fitzpatrick-was
necessary to overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity, but
addressed themselves virtually exclusively to whether Congress had
made its intentions sufficiently clear.
In 1988, a four member plurality of the Court expressly held in
Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co.,39 that the Commerce Power under the
Article I Interstate Commerce Clause was a sufficient basis to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, because its near-plenary reach
and its limitation of state power.4" The Union Gas rule survived only
seven years. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,4 ' a 5-4 majority
overruled Union Gas,42 reasoning that to allow Commerce power
abrogation would eviscerate Hans.43 Stare decisis did not, therefore,
33. Parden, 377 U.S. at 191.
34. Id. at 196 (allowing the inference that the state had impliedly waived its sovereign
immunity by operating a railroad in interstate commerce).
35. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
36. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
37. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 98 (stating that "Congress has power with respect to the
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity"); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (citing Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456) (stating that
"when acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment without the States' consent"); Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 227; Green, 474
U.S. at 68.
38. See, e.g., Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 227. Here, the Court, invoking the need for
exercise of a valid power to abrogate, went on to state that to determine whether a federal
statute, here the Education of the Handicapped Act, had successfully abrogated state
sovereign immunity, "we have applied a simple but stringent test," viz., whether the
intention was "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Id.
39. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1.
40. Id. at 15-17.
41. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (involving the Indian Commerce Clause).
42. Id. at 48.
43. Id. at 64. The Court also reasoned, inter alia, the Union Gas rationale did not
wholly persuade a majority of the Court, and even that Justice Byron White's
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control, and Article I abrogation should be abandoned." Union Gas
and Seminole Tribe, however, put the powers-centered analysis in the
foreground, especially in light of the Fitzpatrick-inspireddicta of the
1980s cases. Seminole Tribe did not hold positively that there was any
power under which Congress might abrogate, although it did briefly
note that Section 5 was the only remaining power that had been
expressly found to allow for abrogation.45 It was not until Kimel that
the Court decreed, without explanation, that Section 5 was the only
valid power under which Congress could abrogate."
3.

The Enforcement Power Under Section 5 Before City of Boerne

Prior to City of Boerne, there was little jurisprudence on
"effective" Section 5 legislation "enforcing" the substantive
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Cases7
had limited Congress's Section 5 powers to cases involving state (here
meaning governmental) action. Fitzpatrickitself stated only that: (1)
the Fourteenth Amendment "embod[ied] significant limitations on
"necessarily limited" state
state authority;"" (2) Section 5
sovereignty;49 and that (3) Congress's enforcement powers under
Section 5 are "plenary."o The Court stepped back from the
"plenary" authority doctrine in City of Boerne." One way to put the

"'concurrence must be taken on its face to disavow' the plurality's theory." Id. (citation
omitted). This is debatable. After a lengthy clear statement discussion, Justice White
laconically stated that he "agree[d] with the conclusion ... that Congress has the authority
under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . although [he did] not
agree with much of [the plurality's] reasoning." Union Gas, 491 U.S at 57 (emphasis
added). He did not explain what he found problematic. That is not an unqualified
rejection.
44. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S at 64.
45. Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
46. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80.
47. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883). But cf United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 755, 760 (1966) (addressing a private conspiracy under a Reconstruction
statute barring interference with interstate travel, 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1944)). Guest
contemplated the prospect that Congress might enact "other and broader legislation"
under that Section. Id. at 755. This hint was not developed.
48. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456; see also id. at 453-56 (citing and discussing Ex parte
Virginia,100 U.S. 339 (1879)).
49. Id. at 456.
50. Id. ("When Congress acts pursuant to § 5 . . . it is exercising legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant.").
51. But cf Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970) (stating that Congress may
not exercise "unrestrained" plenary authority-which was not quite to say that it
altogetherlacked plenary authority under Section 5, merely that any such power it had was
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thesis of this Article is that the trajectory of the Boerne Doctrine
cases has tended to revert, if not all the way, to the wider scope of the
enforcement powers stated in Fitzpatrick.
That Section 5 powers were extensive was underlined in two
cases repeatedly cited with approval and discussed in detail in City of
Boerne and its progeny. Katzenbach v. Morgan, a Voting Rights Act

("VRA") case regarding a New York State literacy requirement,5
read Congress's Section 5 powers as coextensive with "the same
broad powers expressed in the necessary and proper clause."" Justice
William J. Brennan's 7-2 majority opinion stated that "Congress'
power under Section 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the Amendment; Section 5 grants Congress no power
to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees."54 Justices John
Marshall Harlan and Potter Stewart, dissenting, worried that this
conceded to Congress the power to define the content of Equal
Protection." In Oregon v. Mitchell," regarding Congress's power to
lower the voting age fixed by the states, Justice Hugo Black's plurality
opinion restated the understanding of the limits of Section 5 powers
that prevailed until City of Boerne. The opinion set forth "at least
three limitations" on Congress:57 The legislature (1) may not, under
Section 5, legislatively repeal other constitutional provisions; (2) strip
not "unrestrained"). The Court has never expressly overruled Fitzpatrick on whether
Section 5 powers are plenary, but it has done so impliedly. See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521
U.S. at 522 (discussing the legislative history of Section 5): "Under the revised
[Fourteenth] Amendment [draft then being considered by Congress during
Reconstruction,] Congress' power was no longer plenary but remedial.").
52. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In this case the Court upheld a
congressional bar on English language literacy tests for voting in New York State under
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), although it had previously ruled that
nondiscriminatory literacy tests were constitutional. See Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). A third case to which the Court has repeatedly
adverted as a touchstone for proper exercise of Section 5 powers is South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the VRA's suspension of various voting tests
and devices that lowered minority voting rates in districts where racial discrimination had
been found).
53. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51.
54. Id. at 651 n.10.
55. Id. at 668. Justice John Marshall Harlan II repeated this concern in his separate
opinion, concurring and dissenting, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting). This theme is prominent in the Boerne Doctrine cases.
56. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (plurality opinion) (striking down the section of the Voting
Rights Acts Amendments of 1970 that enfranchised eighteen-year-olds in state and local
elections; holding mooted by the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified in
1971).
57. Id. at 128.
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the states of their power of self-government or exercise
"unrestrained" plenary authority; and (3) "may only 'enforce' the
provisions of the amendments and may do so only by 'appropriate
legislation.""' Justice Black's third point restated Section 5 nearly
verbatim. The sentence immediately following presumably explained
what was meant by "'enforce[ment]' . . . by 'appropriate legislation."'

Congress might not "undercut" the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees against discrimination or "undermine" other rights
incorporated through the Amendment against the states.59 This was
widely taken to mean that the Congress had "the power only to
broaden the scope of fourteenth amendment rights, not to narrow
it."'
Beyond that, "enforcement" was undefined. The Boerne
Doctrine purported to rectify that omission (and vindicate Justices
Harlan and Stewart) by rejecting any congressional power to expand
any constitutional right." I now turn, in the following Section, to
parse City of Boerne and analyze the Boerne Doctrine as set forth in
subsequent cases.
B. The Boerne Doctrine: The Court Audits Congress's Books
1.

The New Limitations

In City of Boerne,62 the Court erected the skeleton of the modern
framework for successful abrogation of state sovereign immunity, in
particular the conditions for successful use of congressional remedial
powers under Section 5. The case did not address abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity because that was not an issue in a
suit against a city, an entity ineligible for state sovereign immunity.
The significance of City of Boerne for the Eleventh Amendment was

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan 'Power' and the Forced Reconsideration of
ConstitutionalDecisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 820 (1986) (citing Morgan, 384 U.S. at
651 n.10) (noting that while this "power" was discussed in only a handful of cases and
never again used by a Court majority in deciding a case, until "recently" [1986] "its critics
were not taken seriously").
61. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-29 (declining to interpret Morgan as
"acknowledging a power [under Section 5] ... to enact legislation that expands the rights
contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment," and citing Justice Potter Stewart's
reservations in his concurrence in Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 296, about any such power).
62. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), was also a Section 5 rather than an
Eleventh Amendment case because, again, the suit was not against a state.
63. See generally City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
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that it explained the requirements for valid exercise of Congress's
enforcement powers, which is necessary for abrogation. The Boerne
Doctrine could in principle be applied to any antidiscrimination
legislation or congressional action under Section 5.' Apart from City
of Boerne and Morrison, the Court has so far applied the Boerne

Doctrine only in Eleventh Amendment cases." Whether it will be
extended again is an open question.
The pertinent language from the Fourteenth Amendment is:
Section 1: [... No] State [shall] deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.6
The Boerne Doctrine directed the courts to apply a three-step
analysis. First, they are to "identify with some precision the scope of
the constitutional right at issue."6 Second, having determined the
"metes and bounds" of the right,' they "examine whether Congress
has identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional ... [action] by
the States."69 This involved a more or less intensive examination of
the record for the evidence of such a pattern." While Congress may

64. Any congressional action to which the Boerne Doctrine might apply would have
to be directed against unconstitutional governmental conduct. But other governmental
entities than the states can engage in such conduct-for example, as Archbishop Flores
alleged, the City of Boerne itself. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S at 517. Furthermore,
Congress may direct its powers against government misconduct by regulation of private
behavior. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
65. I have found one more Supreme Court case outside an Eleventh Amendment
context. See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282-83 (1999) (a VRA case citing
City of Boerne for the proposition that Congress's Section 5 powers allow it to legislate
outside the sphere of constitutional violations in areas traditionally reserved to the states
to deter or remedy constitutional violations).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
67. Garrett,531 U.S. at 365.
68. Id. at 367.
69. Id. at 368.
70. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32 (contrasting the legislative record of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and the Voting Rights Act); Fla. Prepaid,
527 U.S. at 640-43 (1999) (finding no evidence in legislative record of a pattern of state
patent infringement); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (finding in congressional record virtually no
evidence of pattern of unconstitutional discrimination); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27
(finding that record does not show that problem of gender motivated violence exists in
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regulate behavior that is constitutional, exercise of its enforcement
powers in that broader swath can be only "remedial and
preventative"" of state constitutional violations. Third, the court was
to inquire whether the "rights and remedies created" by the
legislation were "proportional[]" and "congruen[t]" to the state
constitutional harm identified.7 2 "Strong measures appropriate to
address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser
one."" The scope and reach of the legislation must be appropriately
limited. A remedy exceeding the evil to be corrected may be fatal to
Section 5 action and abrogation.74
2.

Remedial Versus Substantive Measures and the 'BroaderSwath'

Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers took in a broader
"swath"" than merely enforcing the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. City of Boerne insisted on the distinction between
Congress's power to enforce the Amendment's substantive
guarantees in a "remedial and preventative" way and its lack of
power to "decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions . . . ""

The line "is not easy to discern," 8 but the

separation of powers required it to be drawn.79 The Court, and not
Congress, had the power to say what the laws are.' Retreat from
most states); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-74 (same for employment discrimination against the
disabled, with contrast to congressional findings supporting the Voting Rights Act); Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 729-32 (finding in congressional record and other sources evidence of
extensive sex discrimination); Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23 (likewise with a record partly
grounded in legislative findings and partly constructed by the Court, the Court held that
there was discrimination against the disabled in access to judicial services and other
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights).
71. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525. Legitimate use of Section 5 powers apart from
action against unconstitutional state conduct must be merely "prophylactic." Kimel, 528
U.S. at 81.
72. Garrett,531 U.S. at 372.
73. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
74. Cases where the excessive reach of the remedy was decisive included, inter alia,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-36 (emphasizing that the civil remedy in
challenged provision of VAWA was not directed to state officials). For reservations about
Morrison on its own terms, see the discussion in Part II.C.1.
75. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-18; Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
76. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524.
77. Id. at 519.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 524, 529, 535-36.
80. Id. at 524; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
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judicial review of constitutional provisions would reduce them to
ordinary legislation subject to shifts in political winds." If Congress
could determine what constitutes a constitutional violation or alter
the substance of constitutional rights as decreed by the courts, it
would "no longer be [enforcing], in any meaningful sense, the
'provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The Boerne Doctrine pointed two ways on how to draw the line.
City of Boerne introduced its discussion of the intended breadth of
the enforcement power in familiar terms suggesting a relaxed and
deferential approach. "'It is for Congress in the first instance to
determine ... what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment' and its conclusions are entitled to much
City of Boerne acknowledged Congress had power
deference."'"
under Section 5 to pass "appropriate" legislation "'that is, [legislation]
adapted to carry out the objects the [Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth] amendments have in view" [and do] whatever tends to
enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain.'"" Section 5 was
a "positive grant of legislative power,"" which operated in a "wide
latitude"" that included a "somewhat broader swath of conduct""
than prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Even the more
restrictive Boerne Doctrine cases held up as exemplary provisions of
the Voting Rights Act that ban states from imposing literacy tests that

81. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
Moreover, the legislative and early judicial history of the Amendment showed that
drawing a line was the Framers' intent. Id. at 520-23.
82. Id. at 519 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 536 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). Section 5
itself used the "talismanic" word "appropriate," invoking the broad powers the Court
granted Congress to regulate commerce in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819),
where the Court read the Commerce Clause as permitting Congress to do what was
"necessary and proper," id. at 420, to encompass all "legitimate" ends and all
"appropriate" means, "which are plainly adapted to that end," id. at 421. Cf Mitchell, 400
U.S. at 128. This and similar language was quoted in Flores v. City of Boerne, the opinion
of the Fifth Circuit finding for the plaintiff. 73 F.3d 1352, 1357 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd on
other grounds,521 U.S. 507 (1997).
84. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-18 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 34546 (1879)). The enforcement sections of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
virtually identical in language, are in Section 2 of those provisions. Hereinafter, like the
Court, I speak only of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, incorporating by
reference the other enforcement sections of the other Reconstruction Amendments.
85. Id. at 517 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651).
86. Id. at 519-20.
87. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006);
Lane, 541 U.S. at 518; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737; Garrett,531 U.S. at 367.
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had been upheld as constitutional, in order to "combat racial
discrimination in voting."' The Boerne Doctrine, then, did not hold
that under Section 5, Congress might legislate only against "actual
violations of th[e] provisions" of those Amendments"-in effect that
the narrowest reading of the holding of United States v. Georgia
(more generously, that Congress might also legislate against actual
constitutional violations) exhausted its Section 5 powers. Those
powers were "not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely
parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment."" State
constitutional violations were both the target and the trigger of the
legitimate operation of Section 5 powers. They were required in
sufficient number for valid enforcement action, but did not exhaust it.
However, valid Section 5 legislation might operate in the broader
swath only in order "to remedy and to deter violation of [Fourteenth
Amendment] rights."" Before Fitzpatrick, the Court had made little
of this limitation. Until City of Boerne, it was largely idle despite
repeated recitation in dicta. Things, however, have changed.
A major point of the Boerne Doctrine was to underline that
Section 5 enforcement power "is not unlimited."" Starting with City
of Boerne, the Court significantly narrowed Congress's power to
legislate in the extra-constitutional swath. It would be easy to read
the Boerne Doctrine as merely a set of limitations reining in
congressional power and plaintiffs' rights against the states." Twothirds of the time, from City of Boerne on, the Court determined that
despite Congress's clear intent, it failed to satisfy the requirements for
valid Section 5 action and, thus did not abrogate sovereign immunity,
where that was an issue.94 Nonetheless, the Court's own more recent

88. See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518, 525-27 (discussing South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)).
89. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158 (citing Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456).
90. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
91. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; see also Lane, 541 U.S at 520; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
518.
92. Id. at 518-19 (quoting Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128); see Lane, 541 U.S. at 520; Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 728; Garrett,531 U.S. at 365; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
93. See supra note 2 (citing much scholarship arguing this proposition).
94. Of the nine Boerne Doctrine cases that the Court has considered, it found that
Congress exceeded its Section 5 limits in six of them (City of Boerne itself, Morrison,
FloridaPrepaid, Kimel, Garrett,and Alden), thus failing to abrogate sovereign immunity,
where that was an issue. It was not in City of Boerne and Morrison. In only three of these
cases (Hibbs, Lane, and United States v. Georgia) Congress had satisfied the requirements
to permit a private suit against a state.

276

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 38:2

expansive reconstruction of the Boerne Doctrine showed a change
from the Court's earlier, more restrictive interpretations. Over time,
the outcomes shifted from denials of effective Section 5 action,
upholding state sovereign immunity against the challenged legislation,
to the later affirmations of such action, leading to abrogation of that
immunity in the latest cases. This shift was linked to the Court's later
willingness to expand the record and reframe the cases to increase the
likelihood of a finding of state constitutional violations and therefore
the probability that the legislation in question would pass the
"congruence and proportionality" test for effective Section 5 action.
3.

Congruenceand Proportionalityas the Test for Valid Exercise of
Section 5 Powers

"The test" for whether the distinction between remedial
legislation and substantive redefinition had been respected was
whether the statute satisfied congruence and proportionality." These
terms were not self-explanatory. City of Boerne indicated that for
effective Section 5 action, the measures cannot be "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedy or preventative object that it cannot
be understood as ... designed to prevent[] unconstitutional
behavior."" Or as the Garrett Court put it, "there must be a pattern
of discrimination by the states which violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent
and proportional to the targeted violation."" The issue was the fit
between the strength of the measure and the extent of the evil to be
remedied. What mattered, in the words of Gilbert and Sullivan's

95. Garrett,531 U.S. at 374; see Lane, 541 U.S. at 520; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20, 530; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (seemingly identifying
the two requirements). An alternative statement distinguishing them can be found in the
dissent in Nevada Departmentof Human Resources v. Hibbs, which stated that the Voting
Rights Act was "both congruent, because it 'aimed at areas where voting discrimination
has been most flagrant,' and proportional, because it was necessary to 'banish the blight of
racial discrimination in voting,. . . has infected the electoral process in parts of our country
for nearly a century."' 538 U.S. 721, 757 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting.). Here,
"congruence" emphasized the extent of the evidence for evils (constitutional violations),
and "proportionality" whether and how much the legislation would extend the "broader
swath" beyond strictly constitutional violations to prevent and deter such violations.
Perhaps this is parsing terms too finely.
96. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. See also id. at 530-33 (discussing RFRA's
"sweeping coverage" and contrasting its "reach and scope" with that of the Voting Rights
Act, which had "termination dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates" all of
which RFRA lacked).
97. Garrett,531 U.S. at 374.
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Mikado, was that "the punishment fit the crime." 8 The key things
were that (1) the remedy be framed to address the constitutional evil,
and (2) there be a constitutional evil to remedy. Section 5 legislation
might regulate constitutionally permitted state and other behaviorbut only so far as was prophylactic against unconstitutional state
behavior. However, this did not tell a court how to determine or
Congress to predict when evils or harms called for strong measures or
what latitude Congress had in framing remedial legislation. How to
tell which ones or how much?
We may summarize the core of the test as officially as follows.
First, the courts must determine that the legislative record established
by Congress showed a sufficiently grave ongoing or threatened
pattern of unconstitutional state behavior to warrant federal
legislation. In principle, City of Boerne acknowledged that Congress
had wide discretion in making this determination. Normal "judicial
deference [to Congress] ... is based on "due regard for the decision

of the body constitutionally appointed to decide,"" that is, on the very
separation of powers principles in virtue of which the judiciary
reserved the right to interpret the law. In practice, the Court found
that proper exercise of its own constitutionally appointed
interpretative powers often required it to police congressional
factfinding in Section 5 contexts with considerable rigor.t 0 However,
in practice, the Court became increasingly willing to expand the
record beyond congressional findings, augmenting the legislative
record with its own research into both patterns of litigation" and
social realitiesi 0
Second, the intensity with which the Court reviewed the
legislative record and the statutory remedy varied inversely with the
degree of scrutiny appropriate for judicial evaluation of the alleged
underlying constitutional violation. That was the significance of
taking the determination of "the scope of the constitutional right at

98. ARTHUR SULLIVAN & W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADO 41 (Dover 1992) (1885).
99. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531-32 (quoting Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 207 (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "As a general matter it is
for Congress to determine the method by which it will reach a decision." Id. at 532.
100. The intensified examination of the legislative record and congressional findings
was not limited to the Eleventh Amendment context. For an extensive review of the
recent (post-1995) Court's decreased deference to Congress, see Ruth Colker & James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV 80 (2001).
101. See infra notes 145,191-97, 263-65, 303-10 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 273, 280, 303, and accompanying text.
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issueo to be a matter of applying the appropriate level of scrutiny to
assess the evidence of a pattern of state constitutional violations in
the legislative record.
Courts have typically granted state
classifications by age1" or disability,"o' for instance, far more deference
than state classifications by sex" or acts or laws implicating
fundamental rights and liberties such as due process.1
More
deferential scrutiny meant that the state laws or acts had less
"significant likelihood of being unconstitutional,"' 0 ' than laws or acts
involving more demanding scrutiny. Violations sufficient to trigger
Section 5 powers would generally be harder to find in those cases.
The standard would be more easily met where the scrutiny implicated
in the underlying right was higher and more difficult where it was
lower. This is the "Inverse Relation Principle." The courts normally
subjected the legislative record to far more rigorous examination
when the legislation was targeted at state actions that received
deferential review than when the level of review was more searching.
Third, the scope of "proportional" measures required a
reasonable relation to the constitutional evil. The Court looked
askance at one-size-fits-all sweeping, open-ended remedies for
patterns of violations that the evidence showed to be more limited.
Time and again the Court recurred to the Voting Rights Act, with its
temporal and geographical limits, as exemplary. The provisions there
at issue banned constitutionally permitted but racist literacy tests for
specific renewable periods in areas with demonstrated histories of
racial discrimination in voting. In short, the Court found that
"stronger" measures taking in a broader "swath" of constitutional
state conduct intended as "prophylactic" against actual state
violations were more likely to be found "proportional" to the
constitutional harm when that harm was "worse," in that the courts
examined state action affecting a protected class or fundamental right
more strictly, and vice versa.

103. Garrett,531 U.S. at 365. The determination of the "metes and bounds" of the
right was similarly significant. Id. at 367.
104. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-86.
105. See, e.g., Garrett,531 U.S. at 365-68.
106. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 722; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620.
107. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 523, 528-29.
108. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
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H. Congruence and Proportionality: Explicating the Test:
From City of Boerne to Lane
In this section I survey how the Court has articulated and
developed the test. In the first two cases considered, City of Boerne
itself and Florida Prepaid,the Court found no evidence at all in the
congressional record to support the legislation at issue. In the second
pair of cases, Kimel and Garrett, the Inverse Relation Principle came
into play. These cases involved legislation directed at discrimination
against older people and the disabled, respectively. The Court
reviewed this legislation under a deferential rational basis standard.
In both cases the Court was faced with substantial evidence of
discrimination in the legislative record. In both the Court discounted
the evidence in the record because the state action underlying the
substantive rights affected involved a low level of scrutiny and
therefore a lower likelihood of unconstitutionality. The third pair,
Morrison and Hibbs, concerned legislation protecting rights touching
on sexual equality evaluated, substantively, under heightened
scrutiny. The Court here split the difference, invalidating the one and
upholding the other. Hibbs marked the watershed. After a series of
cases finding ineffective Section 5 action that failed to abrogate
sovereign immunity (where pertinent), the Court, from Hibbs on,
determined that the legislation was effective Section 5 action that did
abrogate that immunity. In Hibbs, Lane and United States v. Georgia,

the Court deployed two new analytical resources: (1) augmentation of
the legislative record with its own research, and in the latter two
cases, (2) recasting the issues to raise the degree of scrutiny of the
underlying substantive right, and thus, by the Inverse Relation
Principle, lowering the intensity of the review of record and remedies.
A. No Evidence in the Record: City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid

As the King of Hearts instructed,1' I begin at the beginning, with
City of Boerne.no This involved a claim of religious discrimination.
The city refused to issue a requested building permit for renovation
of a church that was located in a designated historic district.
Archbishop Flores sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration

109.

LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 106 (1971) (1865) ("'Begin at the

beginning,' the King said, very gravely, 'and go on until you come to an end: then stop."').
110. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. Justice Kennedy wrote the 6-3 majority opinion,
with Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer dissenting; Justice Stevens concurring; and
Justice Scalia concurring in part.
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Act ("RFRA")."'
The Court invalidated the statute because
Congress had overstepped the bounds of its Section 5 powers,
intruding on the power of the judiciary to determine the substance of
the right to Free Exercise of religion. 2 In so doing the Court
established a test for effective Section 5 action. RFRA failed the test
because Congress's legislative record did not adduce sufficient
evidence of intentional religious discrimination". to justify a measure
of this "reach and scope.',H4 With respect to the three-step analysis
above,"' the Court disregarded "the scope of the constitutional right
at issue, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In City
of Boerne, the Court formulated what became the third step, the
congruence and proportionality test, which required attention to the
second step, the state of the legislative record.
The Court found that "RFRA's legislative record lacked
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed
because of religious bigotry.""
In particular, "the history of
persecution in this country detailed in the hearings mentions no
episodes occurring in the last 40 years."" The Court characterized

111. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993)). Congress enacted RFRA to overturn the
Court's decision in Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (rejecting a First Amendment Free Exercise challenge to
state drug laws in the context of religious use of peyote by Native Americans).
112. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20. Congressional has rarely overriden the
Court's statutory interpretations. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 313, 416 (1991). But a congressional
confrontation with a judicial interpretation of a constitutional right was a gage on the
floor. It was not surprising that the Court rebuffed Congress's attempt to override Smith,
invoking the separation of powers. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523-24. See also
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (A "constitutional decision of this
court may not in effect be overridden by an act of Congress.").
113. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
114. Id. at 533. The Court also gave some weight to the statute's adoption of, in effect,
a legislatively imposed strict scrutiny test to ascertain whether a measure substantially
burdened the free exercise of religion. Id. at 533-34. This rationale suggests that the
Court may have felt that Congress went too far in giving legislative directions to the
judiciary, legislatively imposing standards that the Court devised for constitutional review
of state law.
115. The Court did not fully articulate that analysis until Kimel and Garrett. See supra
Part II.B.1. City of Boerne mentioned the level of scrutiny, but only in passing. See City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. City of Boerne did not use the Inverse Relation Principle. See
infra notes 132, 135 and accompanying text.
116. Garrett,531 U.S. at 365.
117. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531.
118. Id. (emphasis added). Some of the evidence Congress heard denied that
"deliberate persecution" is the "usual problem" at least today. Id. at 530. The Court,

Winter 2011]

ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND SECTION 5

281

the evidence as "anecdotal"1 19 or involving only "incidental burdens"
that resulted from enforcement of laws of general applicability that
were not plausibly motivated by "animus or hostility."'" In contrast,
provisions of the Voting Right Act, like the limited prohibition of
constitutionally permissible literacy tests, were supported by
extensive evidence in the record "reflecting the subsisting and
pervasive discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional use of

literacy tests."121

The "reach and scope" 22 of RFRA was an additional problem
"[r]egardless of the state of the legislative record." 123 RFRA had
"[s]weeping coverage... [intruding] at every level of government."124
Unlike the Voting Rights Act, which was targeted "at areas where
voting discrimination has been most flagrant,"2 2 and was limited to
voting laws and terminable absent further violations,'2 ' RFRA lacked
such limitations.127 Appropriate Section 5 legislation does not, said
the Court, "require 'termination dates, geographic restrictions, or

however, had a short memory. Four years before City of Boerne, it had decided Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), which found
that a school's refusal to allow religious organizations access to its facilities to engage in
expression constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. In 1981, it had decided
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), which held that a state university may not exclude
religious groups because of the content of their views from use of open forums made
available for registered student groups. If Congress neglected to mention relevant cases,
the Court might have supplied the deficiency by augmenting the record sua sponte, as it
was shortly to do in FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999). See infra note 142. In 2010,
the Court decided Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), finding no
unconstitutional anti-religious animus in a state law school's requirement of compliance
with nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation for official student groups. The
need to decide the case at this date illustrates that the issue of alleged religious bigotry is
hardly a thing of the past.
119. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31.
120. Id. at 531. The evidence included reports of autopsies objectionable under some
religions and zoning regulations that had incidental effects on churches and synagogues.
Id. The Court then stated that "it is difficult to maintain that [these] are examples of
legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious
practices or that they indicate some widespread pattern of religious discrimination." Id.
121. Id. at 525 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)); see also id.
at 525-27, 530.
122. Id. at 533.
123. Id. at 532.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 525, 533; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315.
126. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
127. Id. at 532.
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egregious predicates."" However, the reasons the Court gave for
the lack of proportionality referred largely to the same lack of
evidence in the legislative record. "Preventative measures ... may be
appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws
affected ... have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional." 129
Because there was no such evidence of religious discrimination, any
statute as broad as RFRA or even, perhaps, any such statute at all,
would be too broad. "RFRA is not designed to identify and
counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their
treatment of religion. In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA
applies are not ones motivated by religious bigotry.",o This is
essentially the same point about the purported paucity of instances of
unconstitutional religious discrimination.
Missing from City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid was any

account of the intensity of the review of the legislative record and the
statutory remedy. This was significant because, the substantive rights
at issue in these cases, Free Exercise and Due Process, received the
highest level of review. In Kimel and subsequent cases that employed
the Inverse Relation Principle, intensive review was explained by the

128. Id. at 533. The Court, however, repeatedly invoked these limitations. See Fla.
Prepaid,527 U.S. at 646-47 (1999) ("An unlimited range of state conduct would expose a
State" to liability under the Patent Remedy Act, and there was "no attempt to confine the
reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement . . . or providing
for suits only against States with .. . a high incidence of infringement"); Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 626-27 ("Section 13981 ... applies uniformly throughout the Nation ... [but] Congress'

findings indicate that the problem of discrimination against the victims of gender
motivated crime does not exist in . . . most States."); Garrett,531 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2001)
(contrasting the VRA's limits to the ADA's "comprehensive national mandate,"
unwarranted absent a showing of a pattern of unconstitutional state discrimination against
the disabled); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737-38 (approving an "across the board, routine
employment benefit" [the FLMA], which the Court found appropriate in view of the
effects of "formerly State-sanctioned stereotypes," but providing a remedy "narrowly
targeted at the faultline between work and family . .. and affect[ing] only one aspect of the
employment relationship"); Lane, 541 U.S. at 531-32 ("The remedy [Title II of the ADA,
prohibiting disability discrimination in public accommodations] is a limited one" because
it requires only reasonable modifications and would not affect the nature of the service
provided.). Apparently, broad, sweeping, inclusive congressional legislation to enforce
Fourteenth Amendment rights must have something else, so far undefined, if it is not
geographically, temporally, or otherwise limited, to be effective Section 5 action. Only
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), fails, without offering any explanation, to
mention any such limitations. See infra Part II.D.
129. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. The prediction about a "significant likelihood" of
unconstitutionality played a central role in Boerne Doctrine cases. See infra passim.
130. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
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low level of scrutiny accorded to the rights at issue, and vice versa.13
In City of Boerne, the Court found no current "subsisting and
pervasive" evil'32 that RFRA might counteract at any level of review,
so that the appropriate degree of scrutiny for a Free Exercise case, to
which the Court made passing reference, was not a major issue.
Congress had essentially pleaded itself out of Court.' However, the
Court observed that Congress might be acting within its Section 5
powers when there is "significant likelihood" of unconstitutional
legislation," but with RFRA the affected laws were not "likely to be
unconstitutional.""' This foreshadowed the Court's later use of its
own predictions of the likelihood of unconstitutionality based on the
Inverse Relation Principle, not used here.
The Court's first application of the proportionality and
congruence test in a specifically Eleventh Amendment context was
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College

Savings Bank."' This was a patent infringement case implicating Due
College Savings Bank had patented a financing
Process.
methodology to ensure that investors could cover college tuition
costs. It sued the defendant Board, which administered a state
program using an allegedly similar methodology, for infringement.
The statute at issue was the Patent Remedy Act ("PRA"), the
language of which expressly stated Congress's intent to abrogate the
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from such suits."' The Court
reaffirmed that Congress lacked the power to abrogate under any of

131. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728; Garrett,531 U.S. at 366-67;
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-84.
132. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525; see also Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 640-43. City of
Boerne raised as an objection to the statute the consideration that it "nevertheless would
require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of
invalidation. . . , a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional
prerogatives," City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533, but it did not give the Inverse Relation
Principle as a reason for close examination of the record, perhaps because it concluded
that there was no record of violations to even consider and discount, unlike the situation
with Kimel and Garrett.
133. See id. at 530-31.
134. Id. at 532.
135. Id. at 535.
136. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 634. The decision was 5-4, with Chief Justice William
Rehnquist writing for the Court and Justice John Paul Stevens dissenting, joined by
Justices David Souter, Stephen Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
137. Id. at 630-31.
138. Id. at 632-33 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994)).
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its Article I powers-here, the Patent Clause.'
But patents are
property, subject to the substantive protection of the Due Process
Clause.'" As with City of Boerne, the level of scrutiny involved
received no meaningful mention. The Court instead focused on the
lack of evidence in the record. Congress's own legislative record
"identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a
pattern of constitutional violations." 14 1
Significantly, but without fanfare, Florida Prepaid marked the
first judicial augmentation of the record, which was to play a large
role in later cases. The Court looked beyond the legislative record
established by Congress to what the courts themselves had
independently determined to be evidence of the dimensions of the
problem the legislation was meant to correct. In a quiet departure
from the Court's willingness in City of Boerne to ignore even its own
case law in finding a pattern of recent unconstitutional conduct, the
Florida Prepaid Court remarked that in the case on appeal, the
Federal Circuit was able to identify "only eight patent infringement
suits prosecuted against the States in the 110 years between 1880 and
1990."14' The meaning of the Court's consideration of cases much
older than City of Boerne's implicit forty-year cutoff, was
ambiguous,143 but older cases came into their own in Hibbs.1" With
Florida Prepaid,a "handful of instances of state patent infringement
that do not necessarily violate the Constitution" 45 would support
neither Section 5 action nor abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
City of Boerne and Florida Prepaidtogether set forth the outlines of

the congruence and proportionality test as well as putting into play
the Court's own independent research, outside of the legislative
record, in assessing the existence of a pattern of constitutional
violations. In the cases discussed in the next Section, the Court

139. Id. at 633.
140. Id. at 641.
141. Id. at 640. The record here involved frank admissions by lawmakers that there
was no such pattern. Id. at 640-41. Moreover a patent infringement by a state was not
itself unconstitutional unless the state provided no adequate remedy. Id. at 643; see also
infra notes 350-52 and accompanying text. But Congress failed to establish that state
remedies were inadequate rather than, perhaps, uncertain, tenuous, and not nationally
uniform. Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 643-44.
142. Id. at 640 (citing Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
143. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531.
144. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729.
145. Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 646.
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articulated the standard for assessment of the record in light of the
scrutiny appropriate for the underlying right.
B. The Likelihood of Constitutional Violations under Rational Basis
Review: The Inverse Relation Principle in Kimel and Garrett.
1.

The Review of the Record in Kimel and Garrett

i.

Similarities and Differences

In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,"' and Board of Trustees of
147
the Court considered suits against
University of Alabama v. Garrett,

state institutions that under statutes that were backed with what
appeared to be substantial evidence of discrimination in the
legislative record. Kimel was brought by employees of Florida State
University under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"). 148 Garrett was a lawsuit against Alabama State schools
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which
required, inter alia, reasonable accommodation for qualified
individuals with disabilities.149 Under City of Boerne, the Court had to

146. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). The highly fractured opinion of
the Court by Justice O'Connor, was in its essential parts 5-4, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the main result and concurred in
other respects; Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in the main result
and dissented from others.
147. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000). This was another 5-4
decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote an important
concurrence to which I will return to below. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented.
148. It was here consolidated with a similar case, MacPherson v. University of
Montevallo, 922 F.2d 776 (11th Cir. 1991). See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 69. All of the cases
involved fairly straightforward claims for disparate treatment and disparate impact
discrimination in compensation because of age. MacPherson, 922 F.2d at 768-70.
149. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), (5), (7), 12112(a), 12112(b)(5)(A) (1990) (cited in
Garrett,531 U.S. at 361). In Garrett,the named plaintiff was forced to give up a Director
of Nursing position for a lower paid position as nurse manager at Birmingham Hospital, a
state institution, after taking a long leave for breast cancer treatment. See Garrett, 531
U.S. at 362. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated the case with Ash v. Alabama Department
of Youth Services under Garrett's name as lead plaintiff. Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala., 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999). Milton Ash, an asthmatic security officer was denied
modification of his duties to avoid exposure to cigarette smoke and an assignment to the
day shift to accommodate his sleep apnea. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 362. Both sought
money damages available for failure to reasonably accommodate and for retaliation under
the ADA. Id. at 363. The question presented in Garrettwas whether an individual may
sue a state for money damages under the ADA, id., although as the Court had noted in
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assess the evidence to determine whether the statute was a congruent
and proportional response to a pattern of state constitutional
violations. In both cases, the Court found the legislative record
wanting after searching review, and so the intended abrogation failed
because the legislation was not valid under the Section 5 enforcement
power. In these cases, the Court articulated an Inverse Relation
Principle, that the review of the record is more intense when the
degree of scrutiny applicable to the underlying substantive right is
more deferential-and, it emerged subsequently, vice versa. Because
of their close parallels, we may treat Kimel and Garretttogether.
Noting in both cases that Eleventh Amendment immunity was a
jurisdictional bar to a suit against any nonconsenting state, 0 the
Court stated that to abrogate that immunity: "[W]e must resolve two
predicate questions: first, whether Congress unequivocally expressed
its intent to abrogate ... ; and second,... whether [it] acted pursuant

to a valid grant of constitutional authority."' 5 ' Both the ADEA and
the ADA satisfied the requirement for a clear statement of intent to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. 5 2 The powers question
was a different matter. In EEOC v. Wyoming,'53 the Court found that
the ADEA was enforceable against the state under the Commerce
Power over a Tenth Amendment challenge.'54 That holding could not
survive an Eleventh Amendment challenge after Seminole Tribe."s

Seminole Tribe, Eleventh Amendment immunity precludes any suit in law or equity, not
merely a suit for money damages. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (citation
omitted); see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 ("The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh
Amendment is that nonconsenting states may not be sued by private individuals in federal
court."); id. at 374 n.9 (stating that private individuals may seek injunctive relief against
the states under Title I of the ADA via Ex parte Young actions against the appropriate
state officials).
150. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73; see also Garrett,531 U.S. at 363.
151. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55); Garrett,531 U.S, at
363-64.
152. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 ("Congress must 'mak[e] its intention [to abrogate]
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." (quoting Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 228)). It
was on its own terms meant to be enforceable against "the government of a State or
political subdivision thereof." Id. at 73-74 (quoting, inter alia, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(x), 216(b)
(1938)). Garrett acknowledged that the ADA easily passes the clear statement test. 531
U.S. at 364 ("A state shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment from an action
in a . . . court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12202 (1990)).
153. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
154. Id. at 243.
155. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79-80 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73); accord
McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2001).
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No such precedent was on point for the ADA. Moreover, with the
ADA, the Court also faced one of its main previous disability cases,
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,"' which had

invalidated the challenged governmental action under heightened
rational basis review."'
ii. Kimel: Valid Exercise of Section 5 Power Necessary as Well as

Sufficient for Abrogation
The Kimel Court significantly enhanced the holdings of
Fitzpatrick and subsequent cases regarding Section 5 powers.
Hitherto the Court had held that valid action under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was a sufficient basis for Eleventh
Amendment abrogation."' In Kimel, the Court decreed for the first
time that the enforcement power was a necessary as well as a
"[T]he private petitioners
sufficient condition for abrogation.
[here] ... may maintain their ADEA suits against the States... , if,
The
and only if the ADEA is appropriate legislation under § 5."
Court did not here or elsewhere explain the additional limitation.
iii. Rational Basis Scrutiny and Intensive Review of the Record
City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid were easy cases, once the
initial apparatus of the Boerne Doctrine was in place. In both, the
Court found that legislative record failed to show that there were any
constitutional violations that required prophylactic remedy. If the
record showed no unconstitutional religious discrimination by the
state for forty years'6o or no pattern of unconstitutional patent
infringements by the state,"' then there was essentially no evil for
Congress to rectify. No legislation could be proportional to a
nonexistent evil. If it is not broke, the Court held in those cases,
Congress may not fix it.

156. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a
denial of a zoning permit for a home for the "retarded" [developmentally disabled] as a
violation of equal protection). In Garrett, the Court devoted most of its attention on the
degree of scrutiny to City of Cleburne. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 366.
157. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50.
158. See Kimel, 526 U.S. at 80 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454-55, and other cases).
159. Id.
160. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. But cf Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729 (citing much
older cases).
161. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645-46 ("[A] handful of instances ... that do not
necessarily violate the Constitution.").
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The Court concluded in Kimel that the amendments to the
ADEA that licensed private suits against the states, added in 1974,
were "an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential
problem."162 Likewise the Court found in Garrettthat Congress failed
to "identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment
against the disabled."163 The record of discrimination against the
disabled examined in Garrett offered a "stark" and unfavorable
contrast with the sort of evidence of racial discrimination presented in
the Voting Rights Act cases.'6 In fact Congress had amassed much
evidence of discrimination against, respectively, older people and the
disabled. This may explain why the Kimel majority opinion did not
begin with a discussion of the state of the record, deferring that for
eight star pages'" until it spelled out the Inverse Relation Principle,
which gave the Court jurisprudential resources to comb the record
and discount much of it. In Garrett, too, the discussion of the
standard of review preceded the analysis of the record.'" I take the
issues in the reverse order to demonstrate in some detail the
ruthlessness with which the Court examined the record.
In sifting the record in Kimel, the problem that the Court
discerned with the evidence was that it did not go directly to
unconstitutional state age discrimination as opposed to age
discrimination at other levels of government or in the private sector,
and was not embodied in formal findings so designated.'" This
ratcheted up the demands on the record for effective enforcement
legislation in three ways: (1) the evidence had to go directly to
unconstitutional discrimination; (2) the violations had to be by the

162. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (Congress "never identified any pattern of age
discrimination by the states, much less discrimination that rose to the level of a
constitutional violation.").
163. Garrett,531 U.S. at 368.
164. Id. at 373. Kimel, by contrast, did not involve an extended comparison between
the record supporting the ADEA and that supporting the Voting Rights Act characteristic
in the Boerne Doctrine cases.
165. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-89.
166. Garrett,531 U.S. at 365-68.
167. As Professors James Brudney and Ruth Colker have noted, the Court's lack of
deference to Congress was part of a larger pattern under which, in various contexts, "the
Court has undermined Congress' ability to decide for itself how and whether to create a
record in support of pending legislation." See Colker & Brudney, supra note 100, at 83
(citing cases).
168. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90. "Congress made no such findings with respect to the
States." Id. at 91.
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states themselves;69 and (3) formally designated congressional
findings had more weight than other evidence.o
As the Court characterized the evidence, the legislative record
for the ADEA consisted "almost entirely of isolated sentences
The Court
slipped from floor debates and legislative reports."...
reports.
House
addressed evidence from two Senate reports and two
Unlike its treatment of the evidence, such as it was, in City of Boerne
and Florida Prepaid,the Court relied almost entirely on conclusory
characterizations rather than on specific citations. For the most part
and in contrast to the prior cases, the Court did not discuss the
content of the Reports or say, for example, whether the "isolated
sentences" were main conclusions or summaries of important
instances or major studies. It did examine congressional hearings that
relied on a California legislative study, which the Court said, had not
shown that "the State had engaged in any unconstitutional age
discrimination."'72 In fact, the Court said, "the majority of the age
limits uncovered" were legal under state law and would pass muster
under the ADEA.'73 How the Court knew that the limits in question
were lawful without any court having adjudicated the is an interesting
and constitutionally troubling question.17 4
169. City of Boerne, of course emphasized that preventing Fourteenth Amendment
violations was the purpose of Section 5 legislation and that there must be enough such
violations to trigger Section 5. See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. However, it did
not insist that only unconstitutional state discrimination counted. Indeed, it suggested the
contrary, dismissing the evidence, little if any of which involved state conduct at all, as not
showing "animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices or that they indicate some
widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country," rather than because it was
not unconstitutional action by a state. Id. at 531; see also supra note 118. Under later
cases the words "unconstitutional State" would accompany the term "pattern" in the
quoted passage. The Court in Florida Prepaid stated that Congress had "identified no
pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations," but neither discussed nor dismissed any other sort of evidence because it
adopted the determination of Federal Circuit that there was none. Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S.
at 640.
170. City of Boerne made no mention of congressional findings at all. The only
reference to "findings" in Florida Prepaid was in Justice Stevens's dissent. See Fla.
Prepaid,527 U.S. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is quite unfair for the Court to strike
down Congress' Act based on an absence of findings supporting a requirement this Court
had not yet articulated.").
171. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; see also id. at 90 (stating that Kimel had "cobble[d] together
assorted sentences ... from a decade's worth of congressional reports and floor debates").
172. Id. at 90.
173. Id.
174. A prediction that a case that was never litigated would survive constitutional
review (or not) skirted violation of the rule against advisory opinions. See Michigan v.
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The Kimel Court noted the comments in the Congressional
Record of six legislators. Among these, it discussed only the
statement of Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas. He had said "there is
ample evidence that age discrimination is broadly practiced in
government employment.""' The Court found that Senator Bentsen's
sources were "newspaper articles about federal employees.""' The
Court ignored without comment the Senator's statement that
"[1]etters from my own State have revealed that state and local
governments have been guilty of discrimination towards older
employees."" This was not deference to the "decision of the body
constitutionally appointed to decide."'7 It did not reflect the "respect
for Congress regularly voiced since the New Deal and solidly
embedded in legal doctrine through the mid 1970s."179
Likewise the Court dismissed as "beside the point" the
"substantial age discrimination [that Congress found] in the private
sector."'" Despite evidence of "broadly practiced" federal age
discrimination, local government discrimination, and "substantial"
private age discrimination, the Court "doubt[ed]" that congressional
findings about the private sector "could be extrapolated to support a
finding of unconstitutionalage discrimination in the public sector." 8'
The Court insisted on direct evidence of unconstitutional action by
the states themselves.'82 Justice Stephen Breyer, dissenting in Garrett,
remarked that "[t]here is no reason to believe that [states] are
immune from the 'stereotypical assumptions' and pattern of
'purposeful unequal treatment' that Congress found prevalent among
private persons and local governments."1 3 Whether or not he was

Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1983) (reaffirming the "need to avoid advisory opinions"); Ala.
State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) ("This Court is without power
to give advisory opinions." (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792))). My object in this
Article is exposition and not critique, but a discussion of whether the Boerne Doctrine is
constitutional on these grounds is called for.
175. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (citation omitted).
179. See Colker & Brudney, supra note 100, at 89.
180. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90.
181. Id.
182. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 365 (refusing plaintiff's contention that unconstitutional
local government discrimination should be considered on the grounds that "only the States
are beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment").
183. Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (ADA context).
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right, the Court's refusal to accept this evidence was not deferential to
Congress.
The Court's treatment of the legislative record in Garrett was
likewise harrowing. Congress had failed to show a "pattern of
irrational state [disability] discrimination."'8' The Court discounted
evidence of disability discrimination by "units of local government,
such as cities and countries,".. because these entities lacked Eleventh
Amendment immunity." It dismissed a general finding of societal
discrimination against the disabled as unhelpful because "the great
majority of the[] instances [in the record] do not deal with the
activities of States.""
Likewise, it determined that evidence of
"discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas of employment
in the privatesector" was irrelevant for the same reasons." The Court
even found that the legislative record was self-undermining. Because
Congress had noted that in 1990, the year that the ADA was enacted,
some 43 million Americans were disabled and that the states then
employed more than 4.5 million people, the Court concluded that the
half-dozen examples of modern day state discrimination that the
plaintiffs cited fell "far short of even suggesting the pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination [required]."189
In dissent, Justice Breyer culled a more extensive set of
allegations of state discrimination, in fact a fifty-state survey, from the
congressional record."~ As in Kimel, the Court discounted this as
"unexamined anecdotal evidence"19' of conduct not necessarily
amounting to constitutional violations. In reply the Court also
remarked on the lack of any formal "legislative findings" of "a

184. Id. at 368 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 369. But cf Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90-91 (skepticism about extrapolation).
There was no more to the Court's reasoning in rejecting local government discrimination
in Garrettthan this.
187. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
188. Id. at 371.
189. Id. at 370. The Court did not explain the relevance of the plaintiffs' briefs to the
adequacy of Congressional record was not explained. Augmentation of the record with
such evidence was not mentioned in the Boerne Doctrine case law or as far as I can
determine elsewhere.
190. Id. at 376, apps. at 390-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 371. The GarrettCourt further notes that the data on which Justice Breyer
relied was submitted to a Task Force rather than directly to Congress itself, id. at 370-71,
but did not explain why that mattered.
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pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States."t 9 The Court said
that this lack "reflects [Congress's] judgment that no pattern of
unconstitutional state action had been documented."193 This went
beyond attributing special weight to formal congressional findings. It
suggested that the lack of such findings amounts to an unstated
negative conclusion. 94
In concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, further attributed negative significance to the
fact that the record lacked evidence of case law on the issue. "If the
States had been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by
[disability discrimination] ... one would have expected to find ...
extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations.
This confirming judicial documentation does not exist."'9 The courts
were thereby invited to assess the legislative record in part by the
results of judicial research at least into this body of adjudicative
facts," an invitation the Court was to accept with gusto in Hibbs and
Lane.197
2.

The Inverse Relation Principle

In both Kimel and Garrett, the Court had to deconstruct and
recharacterize extensive legislative records and, in the case of the
ADA, express findings, if only to dismiss them. Two questions arise:

192. Id. at 371; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92 (no such findings of state age
discrimination). The relevant pattern here was specified as one of unconstitutional state
action. Contra City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (1997); see also supra note 182.
193. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 391 ("Had Congress truly understood this information as
reflecting [such a pattern], one would expect some mention of that conclusion in the Act's
legislative findings."); see also id. at 372.
194. The general rule in statutory interpretation has been that "congressional silence"
"lacks persuasive significance." Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis."
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-86 n.21 (1969). But cf Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1517 (2009) ("Evidence that Congress confronted an issue in some
parts of a statute, while leaving it unaddressed in others, can demonstrate that Congress
meant its silence to be decisive.").
195. Garrett,531 U.S. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
196. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (citing Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (citing
independent judicial research on the infrequency of patent infringement cases against the
states); see also supra note 142 and accompanying text. The concurrence did not cite this
as a precedent for using such research to assess the record.
197. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 524-26 nn.5-14 (citing cases); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729 (citing
cases).
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(1) what accounted for the intensity of this review of the record and
remedy?; and (2) what was the significance of the Court's emphasis
on the need for direct evidence of unconstitutional state
discrimination? The answers take us to the treatment of the degree
of scrutiny for the substantive constitutional rights at issue that
preceded these interrogations of the record. The GarrettCourt called
this the determination of "the scope of the constitutional right at
issue."'"9 In Kimel and Garrett, the Court developed the Inverse
Relation Principle, linking the degree of deference accorded to
actions affecting underlying substantive rights to the intensity of
review of the record and remedy for Section 5 purposes. In the
abrogation or Section 5 context, the appropriate degree of deference
was accorded to the state action that Congress seeks to regulate and
not to the federal legislation regulating such action.
The "degree of scrutiny" is a term of art referring to how much
deference the judiciary has usually given governmental action
implicating the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
or affecting fundamental rights and liberties.199 Most classifications
have received "rational basis" review and generally have been treated
deferentially by the courts. 200 "Strict" scrutiny, the least deferential
sort of review, has been reserved for classifications based on race,
color or national origin.201 Outside the Equal Protection context,

198. Garrett,531 U.S. at 365. The characterization is misleading because the level of
scrutiny does not determine the "substance of the constitutional guarantee." Id. The
"substance of the constitutional guarantee," in Garrett for example, is that the disabled
may not be subject to irrational discrimination. Id. at 367. The term "irrational" signifies
deferential scrutiny. Id. It does not say what the right is (its substance), but how
stringently cases involving it are reviewed.
199. Under long established precedent, there are three levels of scrutiny. In dicta in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), the Court
distinguished between two levels, roughly, legislation affecting "discrete and insular"
minorities which might have immutable characteristics, lack political power, and be
marked by immutable characteristics, on the one hand, which called for heightened
scrutiny, and ordinary social and economic legislation, on the other, which received what is
now called "rational basis" scrutiny. The concept that discrimination because of race,
color, or national origin in particular required especially heightened review-later called
"strict" scrutiny-was introduced in the disgraceful case of Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the detention of Japanese Americans during World War II).
Somewhat less heightened "intermediate scrutiny," appropriate mainly for gender
discrimination, was introduced later. See Reed v. Reed, 401 U.S. 71 (1971) (citing cases);
see also infra note 203.
200. See also infra notes 205-14, 218-220 and accompanying text for discussion.
201. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244,270 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,222 (1995); Shaw v.
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governmental actions affecting fundamental due process or other
basic rights and liberties also typically have received strict or very
heightened scrutiny.2 02 "Intermediate" scrutiny, heightened but not
strict, effectively has applied mainly to classification based on sex.20
In view of these well known standards, Kimel and Garrett
imported into the congruence and proportionality test an Inverse
Relation Principle: The lower the degree of scrutiny appropriate for
the underlying right, the more intense the Court's review of the
adequacy of congressional evidence to support Section 5 measures of
whatever strength is involved, and later emerged, vice versa.204 The
question was the relation between the scope of the right and the state

Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644-45 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
494-95 (1989); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305-06 (1978).
202. With regard to fundamental rights, Justice Thomas, concurring in McDonald v.
City of Chicago, cites with approval an 1823 case that stated, "[w]hen describing those
'fundamental' rights it 'would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate' them
all, but suggested that they could 'be all comprehended under' a broad list of 'general
heads,' such as '[p]rotection by the government,' 'the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind,' 'the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus,' and the right of access to 'the courts of the state,' among others." 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3067 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52
(E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)) (providing a partial list). The list has lengthened considerably
since.
A less-than-inclusive list of fundamental liberties was included by the Court in Washington
v. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997): "In addition to the specific freedoms protected by
the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing
of one's children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to use
contraception, [Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)]; Eisenstadt v. Baird,405 U.S.
438 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California,342 U.S. 165 (1952), and to abortion,
[Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)]."
203. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives"); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24
(1982) (same); see also Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (stating for illegitimacy,
"[s]uch restrictions will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are
substantially related to a legitimate state interest").
204. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 529; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620.
Part of the idea underlying the principle was mentioned but not developed in this way or
so used in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (noting that the statute
"nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant
likelihood of invalidation
., a considerable congressional intrusion into the States'
traditional prerogatives"). Here the attention was directed to intrusion on state
prerogatives rather than intensity of review of the record.
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of record. The more deferential the treatment of the record, the less
deferential the review of the right.
Both Kimel and Garrett began their analyses with an extensive
discussion of the deferential rational basis scrutiny for review of an
Equal Protection claim against government action based on age or
disability.205 Age was "not a suspect classification under the Equal
Protection Clause,"206 and so did not call for heightened scrutiny.
Disability too was not even "quasi-suspect." 207 State classifications by
205. Rational basis review requires only that the legislative end be legitimate and the
means be rationally related to that end. Garrett,531 U.S. at 367; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
Classifications subject to such review were "presumptively rational," id. at 84, and would
as a rule survive a constitutional challenge. They would be overturned only if the Court
concluded that they were irrational. Id. The state need not articulated its reasoning
because the burden is on the opposing party must show that no "reasonably conceivable
state of facts . . . could provide a rational basis for the classification." Garrett,531 U.S. at
367.
Rational basis review has not always been so deferential. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473
U.S. 436 (1985) (invalidating municipal refusal to issue a permit for a home for the
developmentally disabled). Disability, as discussed there, involves rational basis review,
but the governmental action in that case was not upheld. See City of Cleburne,473 U.S. at
445-56; see also infra notes 211, 213-14 and accompanying text. City of Cleburne has been
thought to have involved "heightened" rational basis review, "Equal Protection [or
rational basis with] bite," less stringent than the intermediate or strict scrutiny but less
deferential than ordinary deferential rational basis review. See Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972). Such cases are more common than one
might have thought. See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the
Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357 (1999)
(finding that between 1971 and 1996, the Court applied heightened rational basis scrutiny
in ten of one hundred cases); see also, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding
a liberty right to private consensual sexual conduct between adults under rational basis
review). Had the Court invoked the heightened rational basis review it used in City of
Cleburne, its review of the record might have been less aggressive and the outcome
different.
206. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per
curiam)). Older people have not been subject to a "history of purposeful unequal
treatment," Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313), nor did they
constitute a "discrete and insular minority." Id. (explaining that these are among the
criteria for suspect class status and heightened scrutiny under the Carolene Products
footnote four standard). See infra note 207. Kimel elaborated that a state may even
constitutionally "rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that
are relevant to the state's legitimate interests." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84. And the state may
rationally do so even if age is an unintentionally false proxy for the characteristic in
question. See id.
207. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366 (quoting City of Cleburne,473 U.S at 445); see also Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 728; Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). With disability, unlike age, the
City of Cleburne Court allowed that the developmentally disabled (the Court used
"retarded," the term then in common parlance, 473 U.S. at 445) had "perhaps immutable
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age or disability received only the most deferential level of judicial
scrutiny and so would probably be upheld as constitutional.
"[A]dverse

disparate treatment

often does not amount to a

constitutional violation where rational basis scrutiny applies."208
According to the Court, age and disability, unlike sex or race, were
not "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
end that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect"
irrational bias.2m Rational basis classifications based merely on
"'negative attitudes' or 'fear"' would fail as irrational,210 like the one
in City of Cleburne.21 ' But even irrational prejudice "alone does not a

disabilities setting them off from others .

. . ,

cannot themselves mandate the desired

legislative responses, and . . . claim some degree of prejudice from the public at large."
Garrett,531 U.S. at 366 (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-46). Logically, that was
to say, the disabled qualified as a suspect class.
However, the Court was "reluctant" to include the disabled in the list of suspect
classifications because "it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a
variety of other groups . . ." with these characteristics-including the "aging." City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-46. The list included the "aging, the disabled, the mentally ill
and the infirm." Id. (emphasis added). City of Cleburnewas decided in 1985, after Murgia
(1976) and Bradley (1979), where the Court had denied that the "aging" fit the Carolene
Products footnote four criteria. In the ADA, Congress made formal findings that the
disabled satisfied those criteria. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 516 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(7) (1990). As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., quipped, "[t]he life of the law has not
been logic; it has been experience."

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON

LAW 1 (1991) (1881). (Whose experience, he did not say.)
208. Garrett,531 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
209. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
210. Garrett,531 U.S. at 367 (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448).
211. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. This was one of the Court's two precedents
addressing disability, and the one most discussed by the Garrett Court. The other was
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (upholding Kentucky's involuntary commitment
statute for the developmentally disabled under rational basis review). The attention the
Garrett Court devoted to City of Cleburne might have been devoted in part to
distinguishing the heightened rational basis review used there from the ordinary
deferential rational basis used in Heller. See id. Alternatively, the Court might have relied
primarily on Heller, with or without comment on City of Cleburne, as precedent for
application of traditional rational basis review in disability cases.
Curiously, the Court did neither. It used City of Cleburne as its primary grounds for
explicating rational basis review in a disability context and applying the normally
extremely deferential treatment involved in such review to State disability classifications,
without even remarking on the fact that the municipal action in City of Cleburne failed
under "rational basis with bite." That is, it treated City of Cleburne as if it were no
different from Heller or any other relatively toothless rational basis case. Perhaps that the
Court wished to cabin the meaning of City of Cleburne by suggesting that it was to be
treated no differently than Heller. This would be more comprehensible if it the Court had
not repeatedly reaffirmed its willingness to use "rational basis with bite" to invalidate state
action in other contexts. See supra note 205.
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constitutional violation make,"212 as long as there was some
conceivable rational basis for the discrimination in the m 213 or
perhaps if the discrimination was motivated by mere indifference as
214
opposed to unvarnished animus.
212. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
213. Id. at 372. The Garrett Court further hinted that analysis of a classification for
rational basis review in the Section 5 analysis context may not be subject to the "pretext"
inquiry that can defeat a claim of legitimate nondiscriminatory reason in an
antidiscrimination statute context. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 803 (1973) (rebuttal of employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for disparate
treatment part of prima facie case); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511
(1993) (disbelief in Title VII defendant's nondiscriminatory reason sufficient grounds to
find for plaintiff).
The Court might seem to have rejected application, for Section 5 purposes in rational basis
cases, of the Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins mixed-motive analysis, allowing a finding of
liability if any part of the defendant's motive is unlawfully discriminatory. See PriceWaterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (superseded and modified in part by
statute) ("[E]mployer may not ... prevail ... if [a legitimate reason did not motivate it[s] . . .
decision," or did "only in part. . . ."). Analysis of the record for effective Section 5 action
is subject to rational basis review.
Thus in Garrett, reluctance to pay the costs of even the minimal reasonable
accommodation required by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9), 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (1990)
would be a properly cognizable factor that would make a discriminatory classification pass
rational basis review even if it was also motivated by irrational fear and animus. "States
are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the
disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational. They could quite
hardheadly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job requirements that do not make
allowance for the disabled." Garrett,531 U.S. at 367-68; see also id. at 372. Such cost may
not be very great to become statutorily unreasonable. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't
of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding inter alia that $150 cost of lowering sink
made this requested accommodation for wheelchair-using employee unreasonable).
However, this would be to plainly misread City of Cleburne. What the Court held
impermissible there was the denial of a permit based "merely" on "negative attitudes, or
fear unsubstantiatedby factors that are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding." City
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). That implied that if negative attitudes and
fear are involved, they must be substantiated by factors that are "properly cognizable" in
that sort of classification; i.e., the negative attitudes and fear must be justifiable and not
"mere." Disability discrimination could withstand Equal Protection review if motivated
by cost (or some other purportedly rational ground for disparate treatment) and by fear
and negative attitudes, but only if those attitudes were themselves rationally linked to
("substantiated by") to the sort of classification at issue and justifiable ("properly
cognizable") in that sort of proceeding. The mere existence if a rational basis, would not
be enough, if there were also unconnected negative attitudes and fear in the mix.
214. The Garrett concurrence further stated that discriminatory action based on
prejudice due to "indifference or insecurity" rather than "malicious ill will" could pass
constitutional muster because such discriminatory conduct "does not always constitute the
purposeful and intentional conduct required to make out a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause." 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). This was puzzling. One can see how indifference (not caring)
might fail to rise to constitutional intent or purpose, but insecurity would seem to be a
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Congress might legislate prophylactically against constitutionally
permitted state conduct under Section 5, but there must have been
enough unconstitutional state conduct to trigger the enforcement
power, because the purpose of Section 5 is to deter unconstitutional
state action.215 With a right involving rational basis scrutiny, the
likelihood was that there would be too few constitutional violations to
warrant prophylactic application of measures like the ADEA or the
Title I of the ADA against a state. Were the Court actually to have
adjudicated any purported instance of state discrimination in the
legislative record, it would probably have held that the provision or
action was constitutional. It was unlikely that the Court would have
determined that Section 5 enforcement powers had been validly
triggered on such a basis even if the legislative record showed a fair
amount of evidence of state discrimination in the record.
Accordingly, the Court would give the record exacting review to
determine whether the instances of discrimination adduced really did
establish a "pattern of ... discrimination by the States ... that rose to
the level of constitutional violation."216 The Hibbs Court later
expressly stated the converse: "[B]ecause the standard for
demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is
more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test ... it was easier for
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations."217
Here, where the rights at stake involved only rational basis
review, the Court examined the legislative record in demanding
manner. The Garrett dissent characterized the Court's approach
uncharitably but not unfairly as "reviewing the congressional record
as if it were an administrative agency record,"2 18 subject to something

different creature entirely, basically indistinguishable from the mere "fear" prohibited as
free-standing motive for discrimination in City of Cleburne.
215. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 645-47; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518, 534-35.
This does not explain why the Court was reluctant to draw inferences about
unconstitutional state behavior from that of governmental units, e.g., federal or municipal,
or from discrimination in private contexts.
216. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
217. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620 (there noting the
higher degree of scrutiny but finding no pattern of violations). See infra Part II.C.1 for an
analysis of the odd treatment of the record in Morrison. This was the idea behind the
Court's reframing the issue to raise the standard, as in its consideration of Title II of the
ADA in Lane, 541 U.S. at 529 (right of judicial access to courts and other fundamental
rights involved in case "call for a standard of judicial review at least as searching and in
some cases more searching than the standard that applies to sex-based classifications").
218. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The current "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review for agency rulemaking has been called the "hard look"
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like the very high standards for review of agency rulemaking. The
ADEA and Title I of ADA were not "'appropriate' legislation' under
§ 5,"219 ultimately because they "prohibit[ ] very little conduct likely to

be held unconstitutional." 220
To summarize: Whether Section 5 legislation would be congruent
and proportional involved a prediction by the Court about whether it
would be likely to hold actual state practices (if any) adduced in the
legislative record unconstitutional if plaintiffs were to bring lawsuits
and the Court were to actually adjudicate them. 221 The Inverse
Relation Principle linked involved a generalization about the
probability, given the evidence and the degree of scrutiny to which
the right involved was subject, of finding certain state actions to be
unconstitutional-a low probability with discrimination, like age or
disability discrimination, scrutinized under deferential rational basis
review. The likelihood was higher, and review of the record more
relaxed, under kinds of discrimination that received less deferential
review. The intensity of review of the record and remedy varied
inversely with the judicial prediction of the likelihood of the state
constitutional violations needed to trigger Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers. In Eleventh Amendment contexts, this meant

doctrine. See Jessica Mantel, ProceduralSafeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of
Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 343, 387 (2009) (citations
omitted). "[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made . . . [A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence . . ., or is [highly] implausible . .. The reviewing court should not
attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies. . . ." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44 (1983) (citations omitted).
219. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-84; see also Garrett,531 U.S. at 374.
220. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (citing Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 645-47). The cited text from
Florida Prepaid said nothing about the likelihood of any state patent infringement being
unconstitutional beyond observing that the record involved "a handful of instances that do
not necessarily violate the Constitution." Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645-47 (emphasis
added). Florida Prepaid did allude to the likelihood of unconstitutionality is a passing
citation to City of Boerne, see id. at 639, but made little of the issue. Neither did Florida
Prepaidmention the standard of review or invoke the Inverse Relation Principle. City of
Boerne v. Flore also mentioned the likelihood of constitutional violation three times, 521
U.S. 507, 32, 5343, 534-35 (1997), without stating or using the Inverse Relation Rule.
Subsequently, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court explained that infringements of Due
Process like those at stake in Florida Prepaid and Lane itself, "are subject to more
searching judicial review," Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23 (2004); see also
Garrett,531 U.S. at 372-73.
221. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 (emphasis added); see also id. at 83.
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that the intensity of the review of the record crucial to the congruence
and proportionality test depended on the level of scrutiny appropriate
for the constitutional violation that activated Congress's Section 5
powers.
3.

Congruence and Proportionalityin Kimel and Garrett

In Kimel and Garrett, the outcomes of the congruence and
proportionality test were virtually a foregone conclusion with broad,
sweeping legislation like the ADEA or the ADA, lacking
"termination dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates" 222
and unsupported under these exacting standards by evidence of
patterns of unconstitutional state action. After the Court found no
acceptable evidence under the rigorous review of the record called for
by the Inverse Relation Principle that the ADEA was warranted by
"any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less [one] ...
that rose to the level of a constitutional violation,"223 it was no surprise
that the Court found that "Congress had no reason to believe that
broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field." 224
Likewise, the Court determined the rights and remedies created by
the ADA against the states... ADA "far exceed[] what [would be]
constitutionally required," 225 "even if it were possible to squeeze out
of these examples a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the
States." 226 Garrett noted the "stark" 227 contrast in between the
legislation upheld in the Voting Rights Act cases and the ADA. The
VRA was premised on a showing of a "marked pattern of
unconstitutional action by the States,"228 and offered a "detailed but
limited remedial scheme." 229 The ADA presented no such evidence,
but involved a "'comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."' 230 No statute
with such a scope and such a record, the Court said here (it would
change its tune in Hibbs), could survive the test for Section 5

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
Id.
Garrett,531 U.S. at 372 (reasonable accommodation requirement).
Id.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1990)).
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enforcement action. Therefore, it could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
C. Heightened Review, Opposites Outcomes: Morrison and Hibbs
United States v. Morrison231 was the last Boerne Doctrine case to

date in which the legislation was determined to be insufficient.
Hibbs232 was the first of the most recent three cases where the results
were the opposite. Both were sex discrimination cases where the
underlying right involved heightened review. In City of Boerne and
Florida Prepaid,the basic rights implicated also called for elevated
scrutiny, but this consideration played no part in the analysis.233 In
Morrison and Hibbs, however, the degree of scrutiny received
mention, and in Hibbs it had a crucial analytical role. Morrison,
however, is something of an outlier, because virtually the entire
weight of the Section 5 analysis was carried by the scope and nature
of the remedy rather than the record, unlike in Hibbs. The case
might have had a different outcome had it been treated more like
Hibbs, where the Court gave the record a detailed but relaxed review
and found the evidence adequate and the remedy appropriate.
1.

The Outlier: Morrison and Desperately UnconstrainedRemedies

United States v. Morrison234 involved a challenge to the civil
remedies in the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"),2'
providing for monetary damages and other relief against the
perpetrator of "a crime of gender motivated violence."236 Morrison, a
student at Virginia Polytechnical Institute ("Virginia Tech"), a state
institution, admittedly sexually assaulted a female fellow student,
Christy Brozonkala, who sued him in federal court under VAWA.237
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of her complaint, holding,
231. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
232. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
233. See supranotes 112, 132-35, 220 and accompanying text.
234. The decision was 5-4, with an opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a
separate concurrence by Justice Thomas, who also joined the opinion of the Court, and
dissents by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and by Justice
Breyer, joined by the same minority.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The case also addressed and rejected Congress's
attempt to use the Commerce power to support the challenged statute, a topic not
discussed here. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-19
236. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)-(c).
237. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 603. See infra note 254 for further details of the
procedural history.
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inter alia, that the relevant provision of VAWA failed the congruence
and proportionality test for effective Section 5 enforcement action, in
particular because it was not directed against state-here in the sense
of governmental-action. Morrison, like City of Boerne, concerned

only the requirements for Section 5 powers, and not state sovereign
immunity. Morrison was not a state actor with Eleventh Amendment
immunity and Virginia Tech, which was a state actor, was not a party.
Nonetheless, because abrogate state sovereign immunity requires
Section 5 powers, Morrison is pertinent to Eleventh Amendment
issues.
The Court began by noting that "state sponsored gender
discrimination" received heightened "intermediate" review,m and so
would be more likely to be found unconstitutional. Therefore, other
things being equal, a federal gender discrimination law would be
more likely to be a valid exercise of Section 5 powers in the "broader
swath." Here the Court found that other things were not equal.
Morrison was unique among the Boerne Doctrine cases in that the
outcome turned almost exclusively on the remedy. 23 9 The primary
problem was that the civil remedy provided in section 13981 failed the
state action requirement. 240 This is the constraint that the substantive
provisions of Fourteenth Amendment "'have reference to State
Action exclusively and not to any action of private individuals." 24 1
The pertinence of the state action requirement as applied to this
particular case was unclear, as opposed to whether section 13981 fell
within the broader swath outside the sphere of strict state
constitutional violations. Despite this, Morrison did not limit Section
5 action to "legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 242 Rather, Morrison said that Section

238. Id. at 626.
239. The state of the record provided an alternative basis for the decision, which,
however, received only the briefest of discussions. See id. at 626-27.
240. Id. at 621.
241. Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (striking down § 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 as an invalid attempt to exercise Congress's enforcement powers
because that provision was directed at "private persons" who conspired to deprive anyone
of equal protection); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (similar)). Under these and
other Reconstruction precedents, the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment were determined to "'have reference to State [meaning, here, governmental]
action exclusively."' Id. (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879)).
242. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. Legislation in "the
broader swath" was approved in Hibbs and Lane. Morrison itself indicates that legislation
prohibiting "discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself
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13981 was "not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which
the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is not
directed at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias."243 Section 13981
"visits no consequence whatever on any Virginia public official,"244
unlike, e.g., the Voting Rights Act, which regulated the conduct of
state officials and states. 2 45 The Court offered no explanation of the
terms "aimed at" and "directed against." The most natural reading is
that these terms impose no further requirements beyond the demand
that legislation in the "broader swath" be designed to "remedy and
deter" state constitutional violations.246
Morrison squared poorly with Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick held that

Title VII abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, even
though that statute created a private cause of action against
"employers"24 7 and was not primarily directed against discrimination

proscribe," Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626, could satisfy the requirements of Section 5 even if
Section 13981 did not.
243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
247. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Of course, Section 5 action, unlike
abrogation, was not required to meet a clear statement test. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223, 228 (1989). However, Congress's invocation of state action and clear intention
to subject the state to private suit was much clearer in Section 13981 than in Title VII.
The core of Title VII was that "[i]t shall be ... unlawful . . . for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his .

.

. terms [or] conditions . . . of

employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e -2(a) (1964) (emphasis added). "Employer" was not expressly defined to
include any governmental entity. Id. § 2000e(b) ("[E]mployer" means a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce.). Fitzpatrick stated that the 1973 amendments
"includ[ed] ... the States within its purview." Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 449 n.2 ("The term
'person' includes . .. governments, [and] governmental agencies. . . ." (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(a))). However, the basic prohibition of Title VII ran to "employers" and not
"persons."
Fitzpatrick stated that "[t]here is no dispute that in enacting the 1972 Amendments .
extend[ed] coverage to the States as employers," citing the legislative history-viz. two
congressional reports. Id. at 453 n.9. That might suffice for a state action requirement,
but the express language in Section 13981 was absolutely unambiguous ("A person
(including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State. . . ."). That included more than the states, but as frequently noted,
Congress may exercise its Section 5 powers to regulate constitutionally permissible
conduct as long as there is a pattern of state constitutional violations for the broader
prohibition to prevent and deter. With Section 13981, Congress expressly so found, as the
Court admitted. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (Section 13981 "is supported by numerous
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by governmental employers. Neither did Congress target Title VII
narrowly at state employers-although in 1972 it amended the statute
to include them. Section 13981 did not exclude civil action against
state officials who commit acts of gender-motivated violence, on the
contrary. In fact, Congress expressly built in a state action
jurisdictional element in terms familiar from civil rights law: Included
in scope of the law were crimes committed "under [the] color of any
[state law] . . . [or] custom .,,248 The Court acknowledged in principle
the respect due "for the decisions of a coordinate branch of
Government," 249 but rejected Congress's conclusion that a private
right of action against non-state and state actors for constitutionally
permissible discrimination could deter and prevent state
constitutional violations.
The Court offered, as an alternative ground for decision, a brief
and conclusory discussion of the record,2 o saying that "Congress'
findings indicate that the problem of discrimination against the
victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or
even most States." 251 Accordingly a uniform, national law like section
13981, applying to all states, was not congruent or proportional to the
documented evil.252 The Court recurred to the usual contrast with the
findings" [Commerce Clause context].); see also id. at 620. See also infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948) ("Whoever,
under color of any law . . . or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State . . . to the

deprivation of any [legal] rights . . ., shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; ... or if such acts include.. . , aggravated sexual abuse ... shall be
fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be
sentenced to death."), with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) ("Every person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any . . . person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ... ).
249. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
250. Id. at 626, 627.
251. Id. at 626.
252. Id. at 625-26. That is the Court's entire discussion of the record with respect to
Section 5. The discussion of the record supporting the Commerce power basis for the
provision was, by contrast, highly comprehensive and elaborately reasoned-perhaps
because of the felt need to justify the Court's determination in view of the long tradition of
extreme deference to legislation under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 607-19. At the
time, in sixty years, the Court had struck down only one Commerce power statute, the
Gun Free School Zone Act, in large part on insufficiency of the record and the findings.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
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Voting Rights Act, which targeted "only ... the State[s] where the
evil found by Congress existed."253 This lack of discussion might seem
puzzling in light of the Court's observation that the statute "is
supported by a voluminous Congressional record." 254 Congress's
findings of state constitutional violations in Morrison are no thinner
than in Hibbs. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Morrison was
255
wrongly decided on the Court's own terms.
The justifiability of the Court's conclusion in Morrison, however,
is not at issue here. The question is an explanatory one. Why, after
the rigorous examination of the record in Kimel and Garrett,did the
Morrison Court essentially ignore the "voluminous" evidence that it
admitted existed? The Inverse Relation Principle suggests an
analyticalanswer: At a higher standard of scrutiny for the underlying
right, the Court gave the record less rigorous attention. However,
that Principle also indicated a more deferential approach to the
record and the remedy. In Hibbs and Lane the Court's treatment of

253. Morrison,529 U.S. at 626-27.
254. Id. at 619-20. This evidence supported the conclusion "that many participants in
state justice systems are perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and assumptions."
Id. at 620 (citing House and Senate Reports). "Congress concluded that these
discriminatory stereotypes often result in insufficient investigation and prosecution of
gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims
of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually convicted
of gender-motivated violence." Id. The Court ignored the new salience it had given
express Congressional findings. Cf Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 ("[H]ad Congress truly
understood this information as reflecting [such a pattern], one would expect some mention
of that conclusion in the Act's legislative findings."); see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90, 91. In
Morrison, the formal findings did reflect Congress's belief in the existence of a pattern, but
that made no difference to the outcome.
The facts of Morrison exemplified Congress's findings. A state educational institution's
disciplinary board heard evidence that Morrison had raped the plaintiff. Morrison, 529
U.S. at 603 (He "admitted having sexual conduct with [plaintiff] despite the fact that she
twice told him 'no."'). Rape was a felony punishable by five years to life in Virginia. See
VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (B) (1950); see also 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1948) (a potential capital crime)
(summarized in supra note 248). The Board sentenced Morrison to two semesters
suspension from school. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 603, 607. Then, at a second hearing, the
charges "changed from 'sexual assault' to 'using abusive language,"' because the school
policy prohibiting rape "had not been widely circulated among the students," who were
apparently therefore not on notice that rape was against school policy as well as the
criminal law. Id. The Board resentenced Morrison to two months suspension, and set
aside this disciplinary action on administrative appeal as "excessive" in comparison to
other violations of school policy. Id. If that was not insufficient prosecution of gendermotivated crime and unacceptably lenient punishment for someone who was admittedly
guilty of gender-motivated violence, it will do till the real thing comes along.
255. Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 11, at 110 ("Morrison is troubling precisely
because it cannot be squared with the reasoning of these earlier cases.").
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the record was both more comprehensive and more deferential. It
appears that in Morrison the Court determined that the remedy was
so defective that no degree of deference to the record at any level of
scrutiny could save section 13981. This was the converse of City of
Boerne or FloridaPrepaid,where the records were so threadbare that
they justified no remedy. Nonetheless, in this first application of the
Inverse Relation Principle where the substantive right was subject to
heightened scrutiny, the Court gave the record a review that, if
dismissive rather than deferential, was at least predictably not
rigorous.
2.

Hibbs: The Turning of the Tide

In Hibbs,25 6 the Court affirmed the right of state employees to
recover money damages for violations of the Family Medical Leave
Act ("FMLA").257 In Hibbs, for the first time in the City of Boerne
line of cases, the Court found that Congress had appropriately
exercised its enforcement powers and thus abrogated the state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Hibbs marked the turning point in
the articulation of the Boerne Doctrine in two ways. First, beginning
with Hibbs, the Court upheld the challenged statutes in which it
considered Eleventh Amendment abrogation or the reach of Section
5 power. 258 Second, in all three post-Morrison Boerne Doctrine cases,
the Court achieved this result by deploying the new resources it in the
earlier cases, notably the Inverse Relation Principle and judicial
augmentation of the record.25 9 The Hibbs majority opinion allowed
for more kinds of evidence than the Court had hitherto treated as
even relevant to congruence and proportionality. Moreover, the
FLMA was precisely the kind of broad, sweeping measure that the
Court had hitherto found problematic.
Hibbs, like Morrison, involved a sex discrimination statute that
triggered heightened scrutiny in a constitutional case,2 60 but unlike
256. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion
of the Court in this 6-3 decision, joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Justice Souter also concurred, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice
Scalia dissented, as did Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
257. Id. at 726 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612-2617 (the FMLA)).
258. See also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
259. A third approach, reframing the issue, will emerge in Lane and United States v.
Georgia.
260. Id. at 729 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down all
male admissions to the Virginia Military Institute)).
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Morrison, the Court gave the record in Hibbs a review that was
anything but cursory but was also highly deferential. Noting that in
Garrett and Kimel, the Court had come out the other way on broadly
similar sorts of evidence, Hibbs explicitly distinguished them by
invoking the Inverse Relation Principle. Unlike disability and age
discrimination, said the Court, "state gender discrimination . . .
triggers a heightened level of scrutiny. . . [under which] it was easier
for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations."26 1
This was the first express statement that a higher standard of scrutiny
meant, other things being equal, less intensive, more deferential
examination of the record. Previously, this side of the Principle had
only been implied.
Under the relaxed review of the record for congruence and
proportionality appropriate for state action examined under
heightened scrutiny, the Court deployed the range of new means to
evaluate the evidence that the Court had developed over prior cases,
and in fact supplemented them considerably. The Court no longer
insisted, as it had in Kimel and Garrett,on direct evidence of nothing
but a pattern of specifically state constitutional violations. Evidence
of other sex discrimination, like that discounted under the searching
review of the record where the underlying right was subject only to
rational basis review, became relevant (even in the dissent's view262)
and in fact persuasive when heightened scrutiny was involved. Hibbs
also augmented the congressional record with its own findings, both
judicial and factual. Taking up the hint in the Garrett concurrence
that "[i]f the States had been transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment, . . . one would have expected to find . . . extensive
litigation,"263 the Court looked into the history of litigation around
gender-discriminatory laws. The Court ignored the implicit fortyyear limit for evidence of violations that it had invoked in City of

261. Id. at 736 (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. 515; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)). The
Court did not discuss its finding of a constitutional violation for disability discrimination
under heightened rational basis scrutiny in City of Cleburne or its inability to find a
pattern of constitution violations under intermediate scrutiny in Morrison.
262. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 746-47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("While the evidence of
discrimination by private entities may be relevant, it does not, by itself, justify the
abrogation of States' sovereign immunity." (emphasis added)); see also Lane, 541 U.S. at
541 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (similar with respect to the potential relevance of this
evidence).
263. Garrett,531 U.S. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Florida Prepaid,527
U.S. at 640, where the Court took cognizance of the Federal Circuit's review of the sparse
history of patent suits against the states. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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Boerne.2" Hibbs cited cases involving sexist state laws from 30 to 140
years ago, from Frontierio v. Richardson (1973) to Bradwell v. State
(1873).265 Moreover, for the first time, the Court used the barefact of
prior Congressional legislation against sex discrimination in

employment (Title VII), thirty-six years before Hibbs, as support for
the continuing need for legislation of that general sort. The Court
noted that it had upheld the Title VII abrogation of state sovereign
immunity was upheld in Fitzpatrick.2 6 The Court even invoked, also
for the first time in the Boerne Doctrine jurisprudence, its own factual
findings, including its then thirty-year old factual findings in Fronterio
(1973)-a case involving federal sex discrimination-"that ... women

still face pervasive, though at times more subtle, discrimination in the

job market." 267
Turning to the congressional record proper,26 the Court stated
that "States continue to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in the

264. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (stating that "the history of persecution in this
country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the last 40 years"). The
Court there established no rule that thirty-nine years was the sell-by date of a violation
with evidentiary weight for congruence and proportionality purposes. It simply dismissed
older evidence-and, as we have seen, ignored more recent evidence. See supra note 118.
265. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). While these cases were "only" twenty-seven and twenty-nine
years old at the time, one might doubt whether the City of Boerne plaintiff would have
fared any better had he relied upon cases of that vintage. The Court also cited Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 62 (1961) (upholding a law differentially granting women exemption
from jury duty so that they could discharge their maternal functions); Goesart v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan law barring women from tending bar); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a state law limiting women's waged working
hours); and Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (upholding Illinois law barring women
from practicing law)). None of the pre-Reed cases would have the same outcome on the
merits today, but the Court in those instances and at the time had found the gender
discrimination at issue in those cases was in fact constitutional, so this was interestingly
extended evidence of a pattern of unconstitutionality. The spectre of advisory opinions
haunts the Boerne Doctrine case law again. The only recent Supreme Court litigation
invoked by the Hibbs Court was United States v. Virginia,518 U.S. 515 (1996).
266. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-30 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)). Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote both opinions-twenty-seven years apart to be sure. He made
nothing of the fact that that Fitzpatrick had been a race rather than a sex discrimination
case.
267. Id. at 730 (citing Frontierio,411 U.S. at 686). Compare the Court's dismissive
treatment of Senator Lloyd Bentsen's evidence in Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89, where the Court
researched the subject of the letters that the Senator cited to dismiss evidence of federal
discrimination as irrelevant a widespread pattern of state discrimination. See supra notes
175-77 and accompanying text; see also infra note 269 and accompanying text.
268. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (considering the "evidence [of the scope of discrimination]
that was before Congress when it enacted the FMLA").
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employment context, specifically in the administration of leave
benefits."a 9 In so doing, it here sanctioned Congress's use of evidence
of private sector discrimination in maternity leave policies, as well as
"public sector" discrimination not specifically identified as state
discrimination, abandoning "doubts whether [evidence about private
sector discrimination] could be extrapolated to support a finding of
unconstitutional... discrimination in the public sector, [much less] a
widespread pattern of ... discrimination by the States." 27 0 The Court
did cite congressional evidence that "[m]any states"2 71 offered
discriminatory maternity leave and "fifteen states provided women
with up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only four
provided men with the same."2 72 And the Court supplemented the
legislative record with its own further research into the state
legislative landscape as well as the case law. The Court referred to
specific discriminatory laws in seven states, and three where leave was

269. Id. For this conclusion about employment markets and the holding that
"[r]eliance on such stereotypes cannot justify the States' gender discrimination in this
area," id., the Court cited United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S at 533, an educational
discrimination case. Whether under the standards of Kimel or Garrett this "extrapolation"
from education to employment contexts would have been allowed was doubtful. See, e.g.,
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90-91.
270. Id. Among other things, Hibbs used private sector evidence from the legislative
record of "widespread" "employers' reliance" on "stereotype-based beliefs about the
allocation of family duties .. . in establishing discriminatory leave policies," including: "[A]
1990 Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") survey [that] stated that 37 percent of surveyed
private-sector employees were covered by maternity leave policies, while only 18 percent
were covered by paternity leave policies." Hibb, 538 U.S. at 730 (internal citation
omitted). Hibbs remarked that the numbers from "a similar BLS survey the previous year
were 33 percent and 16 percent, respectively.. . . show[ing] a widening of the gender gap
during the same period." Id.
Hibbs also gave weight to evidence of general, not specifically state-identified "public
sector" discrimination: "[A] 50-state survey also before Congress demonstrated that '[t]he
proportion and construction of leave policies available to public sector employees differs
little from those offered private sector employees."' Id. at 730 n.3. And Hibbs treated
such evidence as equally cogent: "Parental leave for fathers . . . is rare. Even . . . [w]here

child-care leave policies do exist, men, both in the public and private sectors, receive
notoriously discriminatory treatment in their requests for such leave." Id. at 731.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 372. The other evidence in the legislative record was of the same kind, e.g.,
that state employer's union contracts "often" granted discriminatory women-only
maternity leave," and that state leave laws "often" authorized leave without pay for
maternity and not for paternity purposes, id. at 371 nn.5, 7. The Court cited testimony
before Congress that "facially gender-neutral state laws and policies were applied in a
discriminatory way." Id. at 732. Although as the dissent noted, this conclusion was derived
from a study of federal employers. Id. at 749 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This was precisely
the same sort of evidence it had dismissed as irrelevant in Garrett.
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discretionary, although it did not say that the laws were applied in a
discriminatory manner, and mentioned twelve states that provided no
family leave at all.273
The dissent gave this evidence the sort of close analysis to which
the Court subjected the record in City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett,
and found evidence of unconstitutional state behavior in only three
states. The dissent stated that this was insufficient for proportionality
and congruence.27 The record that Hibbs approved as adequate
evidence of a pattern of sex discrimination in employment would not
have passed muster even in Morrison, where congressional findings
were fatally deficient for Section 5 purposes because they did not
show that "the problem of discrimination ... [to which the statute at
issue was directed] . . . exist[s] in all States, or even in most States."27 5
The adequacy of the record, augmented here by the Court's own
research, did the brunt of the work the congruence and
proportionality test, but the scope of the remedy also mattered. Here
too, Hibbs presented a striking contrast to Morrison and earlier
Boerne Doctrine cases. The Court had consistently praised limited
legislation with "termination dates, geographic restrictions," and
other limitations of scope.276 However, the Hibbs Court itself
characterized the FMLA as an "across-the-board routine
employment benefit for all eligible employees,"277 intended to impose
"uniform parental and medical leave policies." 278 The statute had no
temporal or geographic restrictions limiting its application to states
where state constitutional violations were found. This had been a
problem for previous employment discrimination statutes in Boerne
Doctrine cases-the ADEA (Kimel) and Title I of the ADA
(Garrett). Hibbs distinguished these statutes because they "applied

273. Id. at 733-34. Under the standards of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1964), pregnant and nonpregnant persons must be treated "the same"
since equal treatment was not discrimination. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20
F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat
similarly affected but nonpregnant employees .....
274. Id. at 753.
275. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
276. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. Here as usual, the Court held up the Voting
Rights Act as exemplary. See id. at 532-33.
277. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 732 (citation omitted). The Court had rejected imposition of uniformity as a
justification for immunity-abrogating Section 5 action in Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 644,
and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627).

Winter 2011]

311

ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND SECTION 5

The
broadly to every aspect of state employers' operations."
FMLA, by contrast was "narrowly targeted at the faultline between
work and family-precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has
been and remains strongestm-and affects only one aspect of the
employment relationship."21 The conclusion about the location and
strength of "the faultline between work and family" was another
judicial factual finding, not identified as based on the legislative
record. The Hibbs Court found adequate such limitations on the
coverage of the FMLAm that it had rejected as sufficient in Kimel
and Garrett.283 With a statute implicating intermediate review, these
limitations on a broad statute intended to create uniformity were
good enough for congruence and proportionality, and thus for
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In sum, under heightened review for the underlying rights, Hibbs
admitted as support for a pattern of unconstitutional state
discrimination: (1) case law regarding litigation about state sex
discrimination uncovered by its own research and not attributed to
the legislative record; (2) that was well past the City of Boerne fortyyear sell-by date for currency; (3) and in which the Court at the time
had found the challenged statutes constitutional rather than
unconstitutional; (4) the fact that Congress had found the problem of
sex discrimination in employment serious enough to prohibit it thirtysix years previously; (5) its own thirty-year old factual findings about
the persistence of subtle sex discrimination.
279

279. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738. The Court did not remark, as it had in Garrett,531 U.S. at
368-69, that City of Boerne was not a suit against a state and did not involve sovereign
immunity.
280. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 738-39. These new sorts of limitations did not impress the dissent, which
recited again the geographic and other limitations implicated in the Voting Rights Act. Id.
at 744, 757 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
283. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-87, 90 (stating Petitioner erroneously relied on the Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification ("BFOQ") defense, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1967)); Kimel,
528 U.S. at 88 (reasonable factors other than age defense, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)); Garrett,
531 U.S. at 372 ("reasonable accommodation," 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1990)). The
Court did not discuss in either Garrettor Lane the restrictive requirement that the ADA
apply only to "qualified [individuals] with a disability." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(2), (5), (7),
12112(a) (emphasis added); see also Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation
Under the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled
for Low-Income Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 345,
362 (2000) ("[L]itigation in an employment discrimination case ... on the threshold
question of whether the plaintiffs disabilities even qualify for protection under the
ADA.").
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The Court also (6) allowed extrapolation to a pattern of
unconstitutional state discrimination in public accommodations based
on (a) a federal sex discrimination case (Frontiero), (b) a state
educational discrimination case (United States v. Virginia), (c)

congressional evidence, augmented by judicial research, of
discriminatory laws or practices in at most thirty-five states,
sometimes referring to "many" states, (d) discriminatory leave
practices in a federal union contract, (e) undifferentiated evidence of
sex discrimination in the "public" sector, and (f) congressional
findings of widespread maternity leave discrimination in the private
sector.
The Court found that this evidence was enough to establish the
congruence and proportionality of a (7) uniform national statute
without (a) geographical or (b) temporal limits, (8) the limitations to
which were that it affected (a) only one aspect of the employment
relationship and (b) specifically what the Court itself determined to
be the "faultline between work and family." My point is not that the
Court was mistaken. It is that the Court was highly deferential.
With the Inverse Relation Principle in play, what a difference the
level of scrutiny makes!
D. Recasting the Issue to Raise the Level of Review: Lane and United
States v. Georgia

Tennessee v. Lanes was the Court's most recent significant
(though not its latest) statement on Section 5 action and Eleventh
Amendment abrogation.m Lane was a companion piece to Garrett.
It addressed Title II of the ADA, prohibiting disability discrimination
by any public entity in public accommodations." The facts of Lane
were graphic and appalling. Compelled to answer criminal charges
on the second floor of a handicapped-inaccessible county courthouse,
Lane, a wheelchair-using paraplegic, crawled up two flights of stairs
to reach the courtroom. On a subsequent trip to the courthouse for a
284. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
285. Lane was another 5-4 decision, with the opinion of the Court written by Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O'Connor provided the
crucial fifth vote. Justice Kennedy joined the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, along with Justice Thomas. Justices Thomas and Scalia each filed their own
dissenting opinions.
286. Id. at 513 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990)) ("No qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability . . . be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity.").
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hearing, Lane refused to crawl or be carried. He was arrested and
jailed for failure to appear.2 He sued under Title II, seeking money
damages and equitable relief.m
Garretthad decided that a state could not be sued under Title I
of the ADA, banning employment discrimination because of
disability. But it expressly left open whether Title II of the ADA
allowed for suits for money damages against the state. 89 The question
in Lane was whether Garrett would control, barring Title II public
accommodation suits against the states even in face of such
"egregious predicates." 29 The degree of scrutiny for disability
discrimination (rational basis) and the legislative record set forth by
Congress were essentially similar to those in Title I, but the Court
imaginatively used the Inverse Relation Principle to lower the
intensity of review of the record and remedies.
The Court's key innovation introduced in Lane was to reframe
the issue in a way that implicated underlying substantive fundamental
constitutional rights that called for heightened scrutiny.291 The
majority opinion stated that, "[i]n addition to enforcing irrational
State discrimination against the disabled, Title II also seeks to
enforce ... other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of
which are subject to more searching judicial review."2 " These
guarantees included the "right of access to the Courts at issue in this
case, . . . protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2 93 They included as well a criminal defendant's Sixth

287. Id. at 513-14. Lane's co-respondent Beverly Jones, a court reporter, also a
wheelchair user, alleged that she had lost work and the opportunity to participate in the
judicial process because she was effectively barred from several similarly inaccessible
county courthouses. Id.
288. Id. at 514 (citing Garrett,531 U.S. at 360 n.1).
289. Id.
290. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
291. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23. The Court was invited to do so by the parties, who
raised Due Process in their Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Lane, 539 U.S. 941 (2003)
(No. 02-1667), and briefed and argued the issue. The Court might have but did not use a
twist on Hibbs, finding the legislative record adequate for Title II purposes under
See supra notes 205-14 and
heightened "rational basis" scrutiny "with bite."
accompanying text.
292. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23. The Court did not specify that the scrutiny was "strict,"
merely that it was as or more elevated than intermediate review. See id. at 529.
293. Id. at 523.
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Amendment rights to trial by jury and the public's First Amendment
right of access to criminal proceedings."2 94
Spelling out the Inverse Relation Principle in terms that will now
be familiar, the Court said that this made it easier to show a pattern
of state discrimination rising to the level of constitutional violations
"than in Garrett or Kimel, both of which concerned legislation that
targeted classifications subject to rational basis review." 295 The
reasoning was the same made explicit in Hibbs: The lower the
standard of review for the underlying rights, the less likely any
particular state action was to be a constitutional violation, but the
higher the standard of review involved the more likely the record was
to exhibit a pattern of constitutional violations.' The Lane Court did
not specify the applicable level of review, but stated that "Title II is
aimed at the enforcement of a variety of rights ... that call for a
standard of review at least as searching, and in some cases more
searching, than the [intermediate] standard that applies to sex-based
classifications."2 97 Against this background the Court did four striking
things.
First, in explaining the reach of Congress's Section 5 powers, the
Lane Court revived a much more expansive notion of those powers
than it had used in the earlier Boerne Doctrine cases. Once more
citing Ex parte Virginia, it said that Section 5 legislation was
"appropriate" if "adapted to the objects the amendments have in
view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain. 298 Lane emphasized rather than merely acknowledged
Congress's power to enact prophylactic legislation against
discrimination that was not itself unconstitutional in order "to carry
out the basic objectives" of the substantive parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 9 The legislation at issue was no less sweeping than the
employment discrimination law at issue in Garrett.
In City of Boerne, it was unclear how much enforcement was
permitted even under the newly emphasized limits. RFRA might

294. Id. The Lane dissent nominally accepted this reframing of the issue and
accompanying heightened scrutiny for the underlying rights. Id. at 540-41 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 529 (majority opinion).
296. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
297. Lane, 541 U.S. at 529.
298. Id. at 520 n.3 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 355-56 (1879)) (citing City
of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-23).
299. Id. at 520.
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have failed even under a generous construction of Section 5 because
of the state of the legislative record as the Court interpreted it, that is
to say, empty. In subsequent cases the Court adopted, via the Inverse
Relation Principle, a restrictive reading. This repeatedly led the
Court to find that Congress had failed to abrogate state sovereign
immunity or enact effective Section 5 legislation in a variety of
contexts, even one involving heightened review, i.e., Morrison. With
Hibbs the Court's Section 5 and thus its abrogation analysis expanded
again. Lane confirmed that Hibbs was not an aberration.
Second, in Lane, the Court reinforced the generous view of what
would count as pertinent evidence that it had adopted in Hibbs. It
referred to "hundreds of examples of unequal treatment of persons
with disabilities by States and their political subdivisions."3 0 Courts
and other providers of judicial services were "typically treated as an
'arm of the state' for Eleventh Amendment purposes,".o. even when

the government involved was not a state proper. The Court also
stated unequivocally that "our cases have recognized that evidence of
constitutional violations on the part of nonstate governmental actors
is relevant to the § 5 inquiry."302
Third, the Lane Court augmented the Congressional record by
citing as evidence of unconstitutional treatment of the disabled
information turned up by its own research into cases, statutes and
"undisputed findings of fact" from previous cases.303 Lane presented
extensive citations to prior judicial decisions and statutes uncovered

300. Id. at 526 (emphasis added) (citing Justice Breyer's dissent in Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 379 (2001), and Appendix C to that dissent, the fifty-state survey of evidence of
violations, id. at 391). Dissenting in Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had relied on
federal and non-State-identified discrimination as well as private discrimination in Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 730-31, reverted to the previous Boerne Doctrine dismissal of evidence
regarding discrimination by nonstate governmental actors. Lane, 541 U.S. at 542.
301. Id. at 527 n.16 (citing cases).
302. Id. at 528 & n.17. The Lane majority pointedly cited Hibbs on the use of this sort
of evidence. 541 U.S. at 228 n.17; see also supra notes 268-74. It might have cited the
Hibbs dissent's concession that use of such evidence "would be relevant if the Court were
considering the constitutionality of the statute as a whole," Lane, 541 U.S. at 541
(emphasis added) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); cf Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 746-47 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting), although not under the majority's approach limiting its consideration to
judicial services. Lane noted that in South Carolinav. Katzenbach, one of the touchstone
cases for valid Section 5 action: "[M]uch of the evidence in . . . involved the conduct of
county and city officials rather than the states." Lane, 541 U.S. at 527 n.16 (citing South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312-15 (1966)).
303. Id. at 525 n.10 (citing Halderman, 465 U.S. at 127). Here the Lane majority
followed Hibbs's reliance on the Court's own prior findings of fact. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at
730 (citing Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686); see also supranote 267.
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by its own research rather than gleaned from the legislative record to
"demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the
administration of justice."" In this regard it followed earlier hints
and practices,' to which the Lane dissent belatedly objected as being
no part of the "legislative record."

The dissent also criticized the

majority's use of cases "arising after the enactment of the ADA or
[not] contain[ing] findings of ... constitutional violations"" because
these did not show that Title II was, when enacted, a "valid response
to documented constitutional violations. "' Whatever the merits of
these objections," they did not square with the Court's own
precedent in Hibbs for use of such evidence.310

304. Lane, 541 U.S. at 525; see also id. at 524-26 & nn.5-14 (citing statutes and cases).
305. The Lane Court followed in the footsteps of Florida Prepaid, which used the
Federal Circuit's independent research into the sparse history of patent suits against the
states, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999), as well as the Garrett concurrence's expectation that the
record would show "confirming judicial documentation," 531 U.S. at 375, if there were
unconstitutional state discrimination against the disabled, and the Hibbs Court's provision
of such independently generated supporting judicial and statutory confirmation to show
the pervasiveness of sex discrimination. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-30.
306. Lane, 541 U.S. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). As the Lane majority
observed, in Hibbs, Chief Justice Rehnquist used precisely this sort of augmentation in the
opinion of the Court. See supra notes 265-67, 302-03.
307. Lane, 541 U.S. at 541 n.5. As the Lane majority observed, the ADA in fact
contained formal findings that the disabled satisfied the criteria for a suspect class and
suffered extensive discrimination. Id. at 516 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1990)).
Further, Section 12101(a)(3) of the findings contained implicit reference to state
discrimination (in "education . .. institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to
public services"). Ten of the cases cited by the Lane majority are pre-1990. See id. at 52526.
308. Id. (emphasis added).
309. The legislative record in the ADA did in fact involve the extensive record of
disability discrimination, in many cases by states. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 391 fol. (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (Appendix C to Justice Breyer's dissent). However, the Garrett majority
treated as "unexamined anecdotal accounts" rather than legislative findings, id. at 370, and
made reference to constitutional challenges to discrimination against the disabled in the
form of the eugenics and involuntary sterilization laws upheld in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 207 (1927) ("Three generations of imbeciles are enough."). The Garrett Court had
specifically dismissed that case as too old and no longer relevant because "there is no
indication that any State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when
the ADA was adopted." Garrett,531 U.S. at 369 n.6.
Hibbs cited, as evidence of employment discrimination against women, cases up to 140
years old which, like Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (upholding Illinois law barring
women from practicing law), were no longer law in any state, and would not survive
constitutional challenge today. Moreover, as the Lane majority noted, in 1979, eleven
years prior to the enactment of the ADA, most states excluded "'idiots' from voting," 541
U.S. at 525, and at the time of the Lane decision, the majority of these laws remained on
the books and had been challenged in litigation. Id.
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Finally, under the Boerne Doctrine the Lane majority had to
show that Title II of the ADA was an appropriately limited response,
proportional and congruent to the state constitutional violations that
triggered Section 5. Under the Inverse Relation Principle as applied
in Hibbs, one would predict that this requirement would be
substantially weakened under heightened review, although Morrison
suggested that the Court could be of two minds on this point. Lane
followed Hibbs in two ways. First, the Court cited as a limiting factor
the consideration that Title II required only "reasonable
modification" to accommodate the disabled." This did not conflict
with Garrett'sdetermination that almost any non-invidious rationale,
such as "hard-heartedly" saving money, would pass the test of
rationality,312 because Lane involved heightened review.313
"[O]rdinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot
justify a State's failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right
of access to the courts.""' Second, the Court limited its own holding
to provision of judicial rather than any other state services.315
The dissent objected that the ADA's provisions swept more
broadly, including many programs that receive only rational basis
scrutiny. "A requirement of accommodation for the disabled [e.g.] at
a state-owned amusement park ... bears no permissible prophylactic
relationship to enabling disablqd persons to exercise their
fundamental constitutional rights.""' Whether or not the dissent was
Neither the Lane dissent nor the Garrett majority discussed, as evidence of
unconstitutional discrimination (perhaps because it was not state), City of Cleburne, 473
U.S. 432 (1985), only five years before the enactment of the ADA. There the Court
agreed that the "retarded" met the criteria for a suspect class, id. at 445, but refused to so
treat them because of the danger of a slippery slope leading to what the Court regarded as
too great an expansion of constitutional antidiscrimination protection, id. at 445-46.
310. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (statement that "women still [at the time of the
decision] face pervasive, though at times more subtle, discrimination in the job market"
(emphasis added)) (a fact not in the legislative record); id. at 733-34 (reference to state
laws at time of decision rather than before enactment).
311. Lane, 541 U.S. at 532, 533.
312. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 367-68.
313. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 533 n.20 ("Because this case implicates the right of access to
the courts, we need not consider whether Title II's duty to accommodate exceeds what the
Constitution requires in the class of cases that implicate only Cleburne's prohibition on
irrational discrimination.").
314. Id. at 533.
315. Id. at 533 & n.20. Lane does not hold that Title II abrogated state sovereign
immunity only with respect to state judicial services, but the opinion went no further than
that leaving open the possibility of further extension.
316. Id. at 550.

318

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 38:2

correct on this point-the FMLA was no less broad-lower courts
indeed took Lane as approval of Title II as effective Section 5
legislation that abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity across the
board.' In practice today, a state-owned amusement park would be
virtually certain to fall under Title II.
The defensibility and effect of the particular limitations
adumbrated in Lane, however, is beside the point here. What Lane
established was that whether a congressional measure was
proportional and congruent to a constitutional evil depended in part
on how the Court framed the evil against which the legislation was
directed. If the Court chose to treat the case as one involving a
substantive Fourteenth Amendment right that received deferential
scrutiny, the likelihood of finding constitutional violations would be
low, and the record would be likely to receive the harrowing negative
scrutiny that it did in Kimel or Garrett. In that case, the legislation
would not likely to be found to be effective Section 5 enforcement
action that could abrogate state sovereign immunity. However, if the
Court treated the case as involving heightened scrutiny, the
"presumption of validity"' would evaporate and the review of the
record relaxed, along with the demands on the tightness of fit of the
remedy to the evil. Together with the Court's authorization to
augment the record with its own research in heightened scrutiny
cases, that would be reasonably likely to lead to a different outcome
unless, as in Florida Prepaid, there really was no evidence of
constitutional violation to be found at all.

317. Thus in typical recent discussions of the Title II, selected almost at random, one
finds the statement, here applied to education, that "[p]ublic institutions are covered by
Title II . . ., which addresses discrimination in the provision of public service by state and
local governments." Paul A. Race & Seth M. Dornier, ADA Amendments Act of 2008:
The Effect on Employers and Educators, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 357, 396 (2009)
(emphasis added) (no discussion of the Lane judicial services limitation); accord Judith
Stilz Ogden & Lawrence Menter, Inaccessible School Webpages: Are Remedies Available?,
38 J.L. & EDUC. 393, 398-99 (2009) (same, no qualification); see also Laura Rothstein,
Disability Law Issues for High Risk Students: Addressing Violence and Disruption, 35 J.C.
& U.L. 691, 694 (2009) ("Title II applies to state and local governmental programs, which
means that state licensing boards are covered." (emphasis added)); Erin E. Patrick,
Comment, Lose Weight or Lose Out: The Legality of State Medicaid Programs that
Overweight Beneficiaries' Receipt of Funds Contingent Upon Healthy Lifestyle Choices, 58
EMORY L.J. 249, 270 (2008) ("Title IT of the ADA applies to ... state Medicaid programs.... "
(emphasis added)). Examples might be multiplied almost indefinitely.
318. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319 ("[A] classification neither involving fundamental
rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.").
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The Court quietly did the same sort of reframing in United States
319
a pro se prisoner case, advertised in the opinion itself as
v. Georgia,'
standing for the none-too-startling proposition that Congress's
Section 5 powers include stopping actual constitutional violations.320
The case arose under the ADA Title II and section 1983,321 but the
Court treated it as implicating the Eighth Amendment?22 The real
unstated lesson of United States v. Georgia, like that of Lane, was in

the judicial reframing. The plaintiff's Title II ADA reasonable
accommodation claims essentially overlapped with his section 1983
claims. The Court treated these as alleging Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference, and therefore in essence as constitutional
claims coextensive with the Title II claims. "[The] same [alleged]
conduct that violated the Eighth Amendment also violated Title II of

the ADA."3 23
Unlike Lane324 and every other Boerne doctrine case, regardless
of the outcome, and despite extensive briefing and argument on the
issue by the parties, the opinion of the Court made no mention
whatsoever of any pattern of constitutional violations to be deterred
and prevented, despite the fact that Title II of the ADA swept more
broadly than the Eighth Amendment or any constitutional
319. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). This was a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Scalia. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, also wrote a
separate concurrence.
320. Id. at 158. As observed below, see infra note 347, Justice Scalia's treatment of
previous Boerne Doctrine cases is tendentious. In United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at
157, he suggests that no previous case in this line alleged any actual constitutional
violation, which was in fact untrue.
321. Id. at 154-55. Tony Goodman (the Petitioner), a wheelchair-using inmate, alleged
a variety of claims for relief relating to the prison's refusal to accommodate his disability.
See id. at 154-56. His initial complaint was unclear and was dismissed without prejudice
by the District Court as too vague to pass even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
8(a)(2) notice pleading standards, id. at 155, although it did include Section 1983 claims of
constitutional violations, id. at 154-55. Goodman found excellent pro bono representation
(Jones Day). See id. at 153. The parties quickly raised and fully briefed argued the issue
of a pattern of constitutional violations and standards of review. See, e.g., Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Goodman v. Georgia, 125 S. Ct. 2266 (2005) (No. 04-1236); see also Reply
Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Georgia, 544 U.S. 1031 (2005) (No. 04-1203).
322. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157.
323. Id.
324. Dictum in Garrettsuggested that Title II might be treated differently. Garrett, 531
U.S. at 360 n.1 ("We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II,
which has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is appropriate legislation
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."). Probably after Garrett'ssevere treatment
of Title I, the Court felt that the result in Lane, addressing Title II in a Due Process
context, had to be distinguished carefully.
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violation.325 Only Justice Stevens in his concurrence, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, set forth evidence from the record of such a pattern.32
Also absent from United States v. Georgia was any clear analysis
of the legislative remedy for congruence and proportionality. The
Court held that "insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action
for damages against the states that actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity."327
The opinion set forth no limiting principles on the breadth of Section
5 legislation used to attack actual constitutional violations. The Court
majority did not expressly invoke the proportionality and congruence
test either in any review of the record or in the analysis of the scope
of the remedy. The remand order might be read as an indirect
allusion to the test.32 8 In any event, United States v. Georgiaand Lane
establish that the Court may frame or reframe the issue of the nature
of violation, and whether and how it does so may have a decisive
effect on the analysis and outcome of the case.
III. The Sky Is Not Falling: The Shift to a More Relaxed Boerne
Doctrine
A. Kimel Reloaded: A Thought Experiment

It may illuminate the changes in the Boerne Doctrine to see how
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,329 the first full statement of the

original Boerne Doctrine applied in an Eleventh Amendment
context, might have come out differently if the Court had had the
precedents and deployed the resources that it developed from Kimel
through United States v. Georgia. My point is not that Kimel was

wrongly or rightly decided at the time, but to illustrate how the law

325. After United States v. Georgia, it is logically conceivable, under the latest version
of the Boerne Doctrine, when an allegation of an actual constitutional violation overlaps
with a violation of putative Section 5 legislation, that the record would not have to show a
pattern of state constitutional violations to satisfy the congruence and proportionality test.
See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text. That would not seem, however, to be a
particularly safe proposition, or a prudent litigation strategy, whether or not the Court
chooses to ignore the evidence of such a pattern or limits in this case.
326. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159.
327. Id.
328. Id. ("[T]he lower courts will be best situated to determine[,] ... insofar as such
misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether
Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is
valid.").
329. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 108.
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and its application changed by examining the older case through the
lens of the present law. Nor do I say that the hypothetical reasoning
and result sketched here in Kimel would be required if the case were
to be decided today-merely that they are possible and, in view of the
latest case law, plausible. I designate the parties and case names in
the thought experiment with an asterisk (*) to clearly indicate which
statements are part of the hypothetical and which refer to actual cases
and parties, which are not so marked.
The first step a court would take would be to reduce the intensity
of the review of the record and the stringency of the proportionality
requirements by reframing the case, as did the Court in Lane and
United States v. Georgia, in terms of rights involving a more rigorous
degree of scrutiny, thereby engaging the Inverse Relation Principle
on the side that lowers the demands on the record and the remedy by
operating in a sphere where state constitutional violations are more
likely."3 o Kimel* and his co-plaintiffs,* as well as MacPherson* and
Narz,* the plaintiffs in the consolidated Kimel case,331 sued state
universities under the ADEA. Age classifications receive deferential
rational basis review, and so are likely to be upheld as
constitutional. 332
But the plaintiffs'* claims also concerned terms and conditions of
state employment. State jobs are, constitutionally, property, subject
to the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under
Board of Regents v. Roth.3

Roth stated that the Fourteenth

Amendment's "procedural protection of property is a safeguard of
the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific
benefits.",34 "[The person] must ... have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to [the interests]."3 If Kimel* and MacPherson's* claims
for relief had been based, unlike Roth's, on discharge because of age
from state jobs in which they had reasonable expectations of
continued employment,33 ' reframing the issue would be relatively
easy. They would be suing for age discrimination in the form of

330. See supra Part II.D.
331. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 69-70. Hereinafter I refer only to Kimel and MacPherson as
plaintiffs, incorporating their co-plaintiffs by reference. I discuss both because their
situations are different in a potentially significant way.
332. Id. at 83; see also supra Part II.B.2.
333. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
334. Id. at 576.
335. Id. at 577.
336. Id.
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deprivation of property in state jobs to which they had a legitimate
claim in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The "same conduct
that violated [Due Process would also have] violated Title II."'
Kimel's and MacPherson's actual cases, however, concerned,
respectively, the defendant's refusal to allocate funds for a previously
agreed-upon raise, which had a disparate impact on older employees
(Kimel)3 8 and the use of an evaluation system that allegedly had a
disparate impact on older faculty (MacPherson).339 These claims
posed more challenging issues. Unlike disparate treatment claims
against public actors, disparate impact claims involving protected
classes generally do not implicate heightened-or any-constitutional
review.3
"[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be...
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a ... discriminatory
"Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but . . .
purpose.""
[s]tanding alone, it does not trigger [strict scrutiny]."342 Kimel*,
however, could contend that the Board's refusal to pay intentionally
deprived him of property-an entitlement to a legitimate claim that
he had already acquired 34 3-because of his age. Depending on the
nature of the agreement and the state of the evidence, he could argue
that the Board violated "existing rules or understandings derived
337. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).
338. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 70.
339. Id. at 69; see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-73 (stating that evidence of disparate
impact "alone is insufficient even ... [under] strict scrutiny" (emphasis added)).
340. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). This must be carefully phrased and
precisely understood. In principle governmental practices and laws with disparate impact
could raise constitutional considerations without being evidence of purposeful
discrimination. See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1341 (2010) (discussing why the Court's statutory decision regarding disparate
impact in Ricci v. DiStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2010), is of potential constitutional import).
My point here is merely that a claim to have suffered disparate impact will not, under
current law, trigger a claim of an intentional constitutional violation sufficient to begin to
implicate Section 5 by itself.
341. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
342. Id. at 240. The "purpose to discriminate [that] must be present . .. ," id. at 236, but
can be proven by circumstantial evidence. MacPherson* might have a constitutional claim
if he had more than disparate impact, but as the Kimel Court summarizes the facts, that
was all he had. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 69.
343. See Bd.. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Other possibilities for
constitutional violations might include a Contract Clause or a Takings claim.
MacPherson's* claim would fall directly under a Due Process violation of property only in
the unlikely event that he could establish an independent entitlement to the promotion he
was denied as well as additional evidence of an intentional deprivation. Disparate impact
alone would not establish a constitutional violation, in policy if not in his particular case:
given other evidence, it might.
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from independent sources such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support entitlement to those
benefits,"' which can be the basis of an entitlement to property in
state employment.
The issue is whether the plaintiffs could maintain an ADEA
claim against the state as appropriate Section 5 action that abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity, not whether Kimel* would win a
direct Due Process property deprivation claim if he were to litigate
the claim. A Due Process claim need only be part of the evidence of a
pattern of age discrimination involving state employment property
deprivations that triggers Section 5 powers. Moreover, it need not be
the plaintiff's own claim as long as there is a pattern of state
violations. Section 5 gives Congress power to regulate conduct that is
not itself unconstitutional as a prophylactic against state
constitutional violations, and a plaintiff may sue in that "broader
swath" without alleging a state constitutional violation. Therefore,
MacPherson* and Kimel* might have claims based in the ADEA's
disparate impact provisions alone. In United States v. Georgia, the
unanimous Court treated as legitimate and even normal Section 5
cases where the claims for relief were not "based, at least in large part
based on conduct that independently violated the provisions of § 1 of
Some of the cases, so
the Fourteenth Amendment."346
characterized," were successful. The issue in Kimel* then would be
whether the plaintiffs' harm fell into the broader swath." It would
344. Id.
345. Id. For some of the legislative history and congressional findings of the 1967
ADEA, see Age Discrimination in Emp't: Hearings Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor
of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 90th Cong. 417 fol. (1967) (discussing prevalence of
problem of age discrimination in employment); Age Discriminationin Emp't: Hearingson
S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare,
90th Cong. 23 fol. (1967) (discussing same).
346. United States v. Georgia, 564 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).
347. As remarked, the characterization of the Boerne Doctrine in United States v.
Georgiawas highly questionable. It relied on dissents contrary to the opinion of the Court
on the point at issue in those cases (Lane, Hibbs), id. at 157, and treated plain allegations
of constitutional violations that the Court rejected without adjudicating on the merits as
"unlikely" or unsupported (City of Boerne, FloridaPrepaid,Garrett,and Kimel). Id. The
Supreme Court here "assumes without deciding" that the plaintiff's constitutional claims
were correct. Id.
348. It is true that the Garrett Court looked askance at disparate impact in the
proportionality context. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 373. However, this was before the turn in
Hibbs and Lane's approval of Title II, which embodied a disparate impact provision. But
see Ricci v. DiStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2010) (not addressing Section 5, abrogation, or any
constitutional issues, but suggesting deep skepticism and perhaps a troubled constitutional
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still be necessary to show evidence of a pattern of state constitutional
violations. Under the Inverse Relation Principle, given the relaxed
evidentiary standards applying under heightened review, 3 9 this would
be far less difficult than in the original Kimel case.
Finally, recall Florida Prepaid's statement that lack of an
adequate state remedy may be the basis for a Due Process claim. In
Alden v. Maine,5 o the Court had held that "States retain immunity
from private suit in their own courts," 35 1 so in that case there was no
remedy for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FSLA"),
nor, here, for an age discrimination in employment claim against a
nonconsenting state in federal or state court. Alden applied to age
discrimination and any other claim under the substantive provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under FloridaPrepaid,a pattern of
intentional deprivation of property in state employment because of
age discrimination (whether or not it involved Kimel* and
MacPherson*) might well be a Due Process issue after Alden because
of lack of adequate remedy.352
Kimel* might then argue that the sort of evidence dismissed in
the actual Kimel case should be treated very differently here. The
legislative record for the ADEA was if anything, more exhaustive
than the record in Hibbs. The congressional reports and floor
debates cited in Senate reports preparatory to the enactment of the
ADEA about the coverage of family leave policies provided
comprehensive evidence of a national pattern of age discrimination.
future for disparate impact claims); see also supra note 348. Nonetheless, even if
MacPherson's "broader swath" disparate impact claim would not wash, as evidence of a
pattern, Kimel's property deprivation claim arguably might.
349. See supraParts II.B.2, I.C.2.
350. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Fair Labor Standards Act ("FSLA") not
enforceable in state court by private suit under Article I powers).
351. Id. at 754; see also supra note 141.
352. The holding of Alden also renders somewhat disingenuous the actual Kimel
Court's statement a year later that "State employees are protected by state age
discrimination statutes and may recover money damages from their State employers in
almost every State in the Union." Alden, 528 U.S. at 91; see also id. at 91-92 ("Those
avenues of relief remain available today just as they were before this decision.") (listing
State age discrimination in employment statutes without identifying which, if any, include
waivers of state sovereign immunity). Unless such a statute did waive the state's
immunity, the Supreme Court's reassurance was misleading.
353. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89, 90 (congressional reports and floor debates); cf Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 730 (BLS statistics cited in a congressional report); id. at 731 (floor testimony
from witnesses at Joint Hearing); see also id. at 731 nn.4-5 (congressional reports and
witnesses testimony), and id. at 732 (same). An age discrimination provision had initially
been included in early drafts of Title VII in 1963. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL
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In the 1967 Act itself, Congress also made formal findings about the
extent and harms of age discrimination? Under the standards of
Hibbs, a court would not treat "the findings Congress made [of]
"substantial age discrimination in the private sector",5 1 would not be
treated as dismissively as they were in the (the actual) Kimel case as
"beside the point ... [because] Congress made no such findings with
respects to the States."35 6 In Hibbs, the Court allowed evidence-not
even findings-of sex discrimination "both in the public and private

sectors"35 7 to be "extrapolated to support a finding of unconstitutional
discrimination in the public sector."3 " The Kimel* Court could treat
evidence of "broadly practiced" federal and local government age
discrimination,"9 as relevant despite not being direct evidence of age
discrimination by the state in particular.
Furthermore, a court might augment the legislative record with
the court's own factual findings. It might, as in Hibbs, cite the
Supreme Court's repeated determination that360 age discrimination in

RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 97
(1990). It was dropped from that statute because of opposition from the AfricanAmerican civil rights coalition, which sought to minimize complications but "a series of
congressional investigations had at least probed field of age discrimination." Id. at 138,
158. See also the extensive legislative record of the 1967 Act summarized in EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229-33 (1983). See infra note 361.
354. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (1967); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (emphasis added)
(insisting on the importance of formal congressional findings for Section 5 action).
355. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729 n.2 (noting and underscoring the existence of formal
findings of sex discrimination).
356. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90.
357. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731 (failing to identify the public sector discrimination
specifically as state discrimination but accepting it as evidence of a pattern of
unconstitutional state violations).
358. See id. at 730, 731 (citing evidence in the record about discriminatory leave
policies in the private sector); cf Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (expressing doubt about such
extrapolation); see also id. at 89 (dismissively referencing evidence of age discrimination
by "local governments" and unidentified "governmental units").
359. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (federal age discrimination as a basis for Section 5
action under heightened review (citing Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686)); cf Kimel, 528 U.S. at
89 (not such a basis under deferential review, including the Court's dismissal of Senator
Bentsen's remarks about "age discrimination [being] broadly practiced in government
employment."). In Kimel* the Court might not choose to dig to determine that the basis
of some of the Senator's evidence concerned federal employment See id. It would be
unlikely to ignore the fact that some of his evidence expressly referenced age
discrimination in "State .. . governments." Id.
360. Cf Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730, 738 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, for the
proposition that women face pervasive employment discrimination and noting that the
family leave benefits of the FMLA are "narrowly targeted precisely where sex-based

326

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 38:2

employment is, and was prior to the enactment of the 1967 Act, a
pervasive problem based on false stereotypes.16' A court might make
(though the plaintiffs could not count on this) pronouncements to
that effect ipse dixet, as the Supreme Court was content to do in
Hibbs.3 62 Perhaps most importantly, in view of both Lane's and
Hibbs's invocation of age discrimination litigation with a
constitutional dimension against the states as evidence of a pattern of
such unconstitutional state discrimination,3 63 a court might include in
the record age discrimination cases that were filed after the passage of
the ADEA.364 The Appendix to this Article comprises a fifty-state
survey with at least one ADEA case raising a potential Due Process
property deprivation issue in almost every state from 1990 through
2010, thereby unambiguously implicating Due Process concerns
calling for heightened review.365

overgeneralization remains the strongest," a claim based on no authority at all given in the
opinion).
361. The Court took notice of congressional determinations to this effect in Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("Congress' promulgation of the ADEA
was prompted by its concern that older workers were being deprived of employment on
the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes."). See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. at 231 ("[A]ge discrimination rarely was based on the sort of animus motivating some
other forms of discrimination, it was based in large part on stereotypes unsupported by
objective fact. . . .").
362. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 ("[T]he persistence of such unconstitutional
discrimination justifies Congress' passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation."); see also
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 ("There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination.").
363. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-30; see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 524-26 nn.5-14.
364. In Fiscal Year 2007, there were 19,103 age discrimination charges filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N,

AGE

DISCRIMINATION

IN

EMPLOYMENT

ACT

(2009),

available at

http://archive.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html; see also Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things
Is Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 839, 896 (2004) ("Age discrimination litigation is among the
fastest growing types of employment discrimination cases.").
As observed, see supra note 308, the Lane dissent's objection that post facto evidence of
cases filed after the enactment of the ADEA did not show that the statute was a "valid
response to documented constitutional violations," 541 U.S. at 544 n.5, was inconsistent
with the Court's use of post facto evidence in Hibbs, such as United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 729 (1996), decided three years after the FMLA was enacted.
365. Our research was not able to locate such cases from every state, but we found
cases in forty-four states and Puerto Rico. Further research or a wider temporal scope
might fill in the gap of six states and the District of Columbia, but it would be hard to deny
that such cases like this in so many states are evidence of a national pattern of
unconstitutional state age discrimination. Lane invoked far fewer. Lane, 541 U.S. at 52426 nn.5-14.
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Finally, there is the congruence and proportionality inquiry. The
hypothetical Kimel* might follow either the Lane strategy of limiting
its holding to a smaller subset of ADEA cases, such as those
implicating Due Process property deprivations,366 or the Hibbs
strategy of approving as appropriate limitations the sort rejected
under the intense review associated with rational basis scrutiny,367 and
its broad approval of "an across-the board, routine employment
benefit for all eligible employees ... [to] attack them ... stereotype[s,
here, behind age discrimination],"" or both.
The long and short of it is that Kimel, assessed under the
standards of the Boerne Doctrine as it has evolved, might well come
out the other way if the Court were assess it using the resources it has
evolved and applied in the development of Section 5 and Eleventh
Amendment abrogation analysis to date. This illustrates the main
point of this Article, that while the Boerne Doctrine tightened
restrictions on Congress's powers to enact Section 5 enforcement
legislation and to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states, it
did so, in the first place, far less than has been widely thought, and in
the second, increasingly less stringently over time. A private plaintiff
wishing to sue a nonconsenting state or bring litigation on the basis
prophylactic legislation in the broader swath of constitutionally
permitted behavior has a great deal of precedent and a good many
tools supplied by the Court, especially if he or she can see a way to
raise the level of scrutiny appropriate for the underlying right at issue.
B. The Boerne Doctrine Restated

It is untrue that in developing the Boerne Doctrine the Court has
barred the courthouse door against private law suits against
nonconsenting states or raised an impassible barrier against Section 5
legislation. Rather, the Court developed standards for abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity and effective Section 5 enforcement
action. These standards replaced the former de facto clear statement
abrogation standards of the pre-Union Gas period with a powers3 69
I now restate the
centered approach foreshadowed in Fitzpatrick.
the Boerne Doctrine in terms that are importantly different from the
366. See id. at 533-34.
367. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738-39; cf Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-88 (citing the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification defense, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1967), and the limitation that
employers may discriminate on "reasonable factors other than age," id.).
368. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737.
369. See supra Part I.A.1-3.
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"official version" set forth above, 70 reflecting its current content and
evolution. Speaking analytically rather than chronologically, the
Boerne Doctrine, first, in Kimel, limited the power under which
Congress might abrogate to Section 5.
In City of Bourne, second, the Court began to develop a complex
congruence and proportionality test for effective enforcement
legislation to prophylaxis, that is, deterrence and prevention of state
constitutional violations: It might regulate constitutionally permitted
behavior in the "broader swath" outside the sphere of the rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment itself, 7 ' as long as it did not
affect the substance of the rights involved. This effectively foreclosed
without expressly overruling the former Morgan "ratchet" theory of
Section 5 action, under which Congress might expand but not
constrict those rights.372
The congruence and proportionality test involved analysis of the
evidence in the record that heightened the bar from City of Boerne
through Garrett,in two ways.' The test required (1) direct evidence
of a pattern of such violations by States in the record.374 The Inverse
Relation Principle, which tied the intensity of review of the record to
the degree of scrutiny accorded the underlying substantive right at
issue,375 enabled the Court to discount much of the evidence of any
such patterns in the legislative record of statutes such as the ADEA
and Title I of the ADA protecting that called for deferential scrutiny,
because under such scrutiny constitutional violations would be
unlikely. The test also required, in practice, (2) limitations on the
scope of Section 5 legislation, in time, space, or structure, or object to
ensure that it was proportional to the pattern of violation and also
merely prophylactic, although such specific limitations of the Section
5 remedies were officially stated not to be a requirement.16 Earlier

370. See supraPart I.B.1-3.
371. See supra Part I.A.1-3.
372. See supraPart I.B.2.
373. I treat Morrison as an outlier for reasons explained above in Part II.C.1. As
argued there, Morrison fits roughly with the analysis presented in this Article, but was
wrongly decided by the Court's own standards.
374. From City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid up until (possibly) United States v.
Georgia, there had to be evidence of a pattern, which was plainly lacking in Florida
Prepaid, and also in City of Boerne, at least as the Court analyzed the records in those
cases.
375. See supra Part II.C.2.
376. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533; see also supra note 128 (listing insistence or
invocation of the limitations on Section 5 legislation in every Boerne Doctrine case).
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Boerne Doctrine cases were more rigorous than the pre-City of
Boerne Section 5 and abrogation cases, so much so that some scholars
of discrimination law, including writers such as Professor Laurence
Tribe, worried that "the sky was falling" on Congress's ability to
create private claims for relief from discrimination and protection of
basic rights against the states and perhaps more broadly.
Subsequently, in Hibbs through United States v. Georgia, the

Court, using the resources developed in the earlier cases, relaxed
those standards, at least where underlying rights received heightened
scrutiny, thereby enhancing the likelihood of finding a pattern of state
The key resources that the Court
constitutional violations.378
deployed were (1) using the Inverse Relation Principle to reframe the
question presented in a way that raised the degree of scrutiny to
which the underlying right was subject; (2) willingness to consider a
wider range of evidence in the legislative record where the law
affecting the underlying right received heightened scrutiny; (3)
augmentation of the record in various ways; and (4) relaxation of the
restrictions on what sorts of measures would count as appropriately
limited to remedy the evil at issue without risking changing the
substance of the right. The result was to reduce the intensity of
review of the record,'7 ' and evinced increased willingness to find that
Congress had satisfied the congruence and proportionality test.
The Court lowered the rigors of the earlier version of the Boerne
Doctrine, without expressly overruling any of the earlier cases in that
line. Nonetheless, the more recent and more relaxed cases are the
most recent word on the subject of abrogating state sovereign
immunity that that the Court has pronounced. The existence of three
such cases, which, furthermore, used resources from the more
stringent earlier cases to relax the demands for Section 5 action and
abrogation in the later cases, indicates a direction rather than an
anomaly. These cases define the current state of the law.
Conclusion
The Boerne Doctrine properly understood, provides litigants,
counsel, and judges with a reasonably good, if far from guaranteed,
set of GPS directions on how to successfully characterize a case as
effective Section 5 enforcement legislation, and in a private suit

377. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
378. For a summary, see the penultimate paragraph of Part II.C.2.
379. In United States v. Georgia,546 U.S. 151 (2006) seemingly, perhaps, to zero.
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against a nonconsenting state, how to clear the Hans jurisdictional
hurdle and overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity. The cases in
this line, interpreted I have indicated, also suggest to defendants the
specific route necessary to defeat such claims, arguing in each
instance that the relaxed criteria do not apply or are not satisfied.
Finally, they provide legislators with fairly clear guidelines on how to
write discrimination and other Fourteenth Amendment statutes that
do not exceed Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers and, where
desired, to abrogate state sovereign immunity beyond saying that was
the intent. If the Court finds some such Section 5 or abrogation
legislation inadequate, the legislature might also in principle supply
any deficiencies retroactively in the manner of United States v.
Lopez,380 amplifying the legislative record and amending the statute to
provide the necessary findings and limitation. This strategy has not so
far been tested and would be a good deal more complicated in these
sorts of cases than in Lopez.
I have largely confined myself in this Article to expounding
and clarifying the new law of Section 5 and Eleventh Amendment
abrogation. I conclude by observing that the Court's approach is
problematic for several reasons beyond the fact that a tendency that
has not been expressly acknowledged and endorsed, is fragile,
particularly since the Roberts Court is, to put it mildly, not strongly
committed to stare decisis."' Indeed, the Boerne Doctrine itself,
although a later Rehnquist Court development, is free with
precedent-although not, in attempting to develop standards for the
powers analysis, necessarily for the worse, at least in that respect.
Nothing the Roberts Court has done to date seems to suggest that the

380. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Shortly after the Court struck down
the Gun Free School Zones Act, by its decision in Lopez, Congress amended the Gun
Free School Zones Act to correct the defect found by the Court, adding to the law the
following language to create the necessary nexus in interstate commerce: "It shall be
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that
otherwise affects interstateor foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1968) (emphasis
added). Because with the new language federal jurisdiction turns upon a "thing" (the gun)
that moved in interstate commerce, the deficiency the Court noted in Lopez was
corrected. See The New Federalism, 16 TOURo L. REV. 265, 274-75 (2000).
381. Senator Charles E. Schumer, Keynote Speech to the American Constitution
Society (July 27, 2007), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/newwebsite/
record.cfm?id=280107 ("In case after case, our most recently confirmed Justices have
appeared to jettison decisions recently authored by their immediate predecessors.
Although Justices Roberts and Alito both expressed their profound respect for stare
decisis at their confirmation hearings, many of their decisions have flouted precedent.").
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Boerne Doctrine as it now stands is up for a significant change.
However, I cannot read the tea leaves and decline to speculate.
More deeply, the underlying method and assumptions of the
Boerne Doctrine are profoundly troubling. As the analysis above has
demonstrated over and over, the new test for effective enforcement
action is, first, highly subjective and arbitrary. Time and again the
Court decrees (or dissents) that evidence in the record, when it
dislikes a putative Section 5 statute, is "anecdotal." When it likes a
statute, it happily supplements the record with anything within reach.
"Principled" is not a word that comes to mind. I do not here claim
that the Court's Boerne Doctrine decisions are merely opportunistic
and result-driven. On the contrary, I have spent a great many pages
attempting to explicate their intricate and demanding inner logic.
Moreover, the Court on the whole has adhered to this logic-setting
aside Morrison-even when specific results run counter to the New
Federalist and ideologically conservative bent of the majority. That is
both praiseworthy and encouraging. Nonetheless, it does not address
the serious concern that evaluations and augmentations of the record,
as well as assessments of proportionality, are fundamentally
standardless.
Second, basing decisions about the adequacy of the record in
view of the Inverse Relation Principle between the degree of scrutiny
implicated in the review of legislation regarding the underlying
substantive right and the likelihood of state constitutional violations
skirts constitutional problems. It threatens to violate the prohibition
on advisory opinions. The inner structure and driving mechanism of
the Boerne Doctrine, ironically, itself a jurisdictional doctrine,
appears to violate the fundamental rule of jurisdiction, that the Court
decides only actual cases and controversies. The Inverse Relation
Principle may give fairly predictable results, which is a virtue. But the
structure is unsound. It is based on the Court's predictions about the
likely outcomes of cases that no one has ever litigated-in most
instances, that no one has ever brought. The resulting tension
between the Article III powers of the judiciary and the Section 5
powers of Congress is considerable. No obvious solution suggests
itself. This calls for further and more critical analysis than I have
given it here.
Third and finally, and subjecting the legislative record to the sort
of interrogation required by the Boerne Doctrine as currently framed
itself violates the basic principle on which the doctrine is based:
respect for separation of powers. It fails to give proper deference, not
merely to a coordinate and coequal branch of government, but
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specifically to the one charged with, and especially competent to,
make findings that the appropriate legislation is necessary. Congress
cannot and should not get a free pass when it comes to findings and
evidence. It can exceed its Section 5 powers and should be pulled
back when it does so. But the constitutional structure and two
centuries of precedent call for a different and more deferential
treatment of what Congress finds in light of the evidence to be
necessary and proper. The Court should not be analyzing the record
as if it were something like an administrative agency record, and least
of all should it be doing so in the haphazard manner that it has so far
under this line of cases. In future work I will suggest an alternative
approach might look like.
For our purposes here, however, it suffices that the Boerne
Doctrine as it has evolved, taken at face value on its own terms, has
progressively become far less harsh, limiting, and restrictive than the
initial post-City of Boerne cases suggested and is still generally held to
be. Two souls did always dwell within its breast: First, the crabbed
and constrained jealous defender of the judiciary's prerogatives that
upheld the rights of states to discriminate, and which blocked the
exercise of the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment
designed to prevent precisely such violations. The second was the
relaxed, expansive reading with a wide view of the scope of
Congress's Section 5 powers and ability to abrogate. The Boerne
construction was narrower than the very broad latitude afforded in
Union Gas and prior cases. Nonetheless, it expressly acknowledged
the "broad grant of legislative power" conferred on Congress by
Section 5, the wide swath of constitutional discrimination that
Congress might prohibit, and that, while Congress may not reshape
the substance of the constitutional rights it enforces, it has much
leeway in the choices it makes in enforcing those rights. At present
the more relaxed view is predominant. If the Court respects its own
precedents, then the relaxed view will remain in place, so as long as
litigants, lawyers, and Congress follow its guidance.
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APPENDIX
A. Selected ADEA Cases Implicating Due Process Property Interests
in State Jobs 1980-2010.

Arevalo v. Or. Dep't of Transp., 2010 WL 1169795 (D. Or. 2010)
(claims brought under ADEA dismissed).
Bailey v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 851 F. Supp. 219 (D.S.C. 1993)
(plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of age discrimination
given inconsistencies in EEOC findings).
Bapat v. Conn. Dep't of Health Servs., 815 F. Supp. 525, (D. Conn.
1992) (holding that state defendants had qualified immunity on
ADEA due process claim challenging personnel decisions short of
employment termination).
Bearelly v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 2002 WL 400779 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(dismissing ADEA claim with prejudice).
Black v. Goodman, 736 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Mont. 1990) (Eleventh
Amendment barred ADEA claims against state university and other
defendants for discharge of university program officer).
Brogdon v. Ala. Dep't of Econ. & Cmty. Affairs, 864 F. Supp. 1161
(M.D. Ala. 1994) (upholding suit of tenured merit system employee
of state agency against Eleventh Amendment challenge).
Chouinard v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 2005 WL 23334 (D.N.H. 2005)
(summary judgment appropriate in favor of state agency in ADEA
case).
Coger v. Bd. of Regents of Tenn., 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998)
(affirming abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in ADEA
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